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INTRODUCTION
A new kind of evidence is making its way to America’s
courts. Social media posts and text messages are surfacing in
trials across the country, and the cases so far represent just the
1
tip of the technological iceberg. The potential enormity of the
emerging evidentiary phenomenon is apparent in the changing
habits of our own lives. Many of us, particularly those under
thirty, constantly transmit observations and impressions
through text messages and social media sites, no matter where
2
we are and what we are (supposed to be) doing. As
“smartphone” ownership expands and younger adults—who already average over 100 text messages per day—replace their
less technologically savvy elders, this new reality will become
3
even more pronounced. Our world is becoming digital. Our tri4
als must surely follow.
† Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School. I would like to
thank Ed Cheng, George Fisher, Ed Imwinkelried, Fred Lederer, Aviva Orenstein, and David Sklansky for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Fred Dingledy and Anna Gillespie provided valuable research assistance.
Thanks most of all to Catherine Zoe Garrett. Copyright © 2013 by Jeffrey
Bellin.
[Editor’s Note: For further discussion of eHearsay, see Colin Miller, No
Explanation Required? A Reply to Jeffrey Bellin’s eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES (forthcoming November 2013), http://www.minnesotalawreview
.org/headnotes.]
1. See, e.g., infra notes 12–13 (identifying recent cases involving electronic communication evidence).
2. See Aaron Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, PEW INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Sept. 19, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/
Reports/2011/Americans%20and%20Text%20Messaging.pdf.
3. See id.; see also Maeve Duggan & Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Activities
2012, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 5 (Nov. 25, 2012), http://
pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_CellActivities_11.25.pdf (reporting survey results that show “[t]exting is nearly universal among young
adults, ages 18–29” and “[t]he vast majority of cell phone owners send and re-
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The trial of Dharun Ravi, whose electronic snooping became front-page news, may be a harbinger of things to come.
Ravi’s trial revolved around “a pixelated paper trail” of “Twitter
feeds, Facebook posts, text messages, e-mails and other online
chatter,” including Ravi’s roommate’s chilling last Facebook
5
status update: “Jumping off the gw bridge sorry.” Similar examples of electronic evidence appear in the news with regularity. In a span of a few weeks this past year: a Dallas woman
sent out a series of tweets before her untimely death, stating
that she had “a [s]talker” who had tried to kill her “3 times be6
fore,” a telephone repairman texted a friend to “CALL . . . AN
AMBULANCE” since he had been “attacked wi[t]h a flat crow7
bar” and had his “head split open,” an American diplomat
killed in a terrorist attack in Libya transmitted an online chat
message shortly before his death, prophetically stating:
“[A]ssuming we don’t die tonight. We saw one of our ‘police’

ceive text messages” with “the exception of mobile phone owners 65 and older”); infra Part I.A (discussing statistics for text messaging and social media
usage).
4. See JOSHUA BRIONES & ANA TAGVORYAN, SOCIAL MEDIA AS EVIDENCE
5 (2013) (“There is . . . little question that litigation will regularly involve social media data as evidence.”); Nicole D. Galli et al., Litigation Considerations
Involving Social Media, 81 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 59, 59 (2010) (“Litigators today ignore social media outlets at their peril: jurors, judges, witnesses, clients and
opponents all use social media, and so too must the savvy litigator . . . .”); Scott
R. Grubman & Robert H. Snyder, Web 2.0 Crashes Through the Courthouse
Door: Legal and Ethical Issues Related to the Discoverability and Admissibility
of Social Networking Evidence, 37 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 156, 203
(2011) (“[G]iven the explosion of social networking usage, an attorney may be
violating their ethical duty by failing to investigate the case fully by searching
for relevant online information.”); Aviva Orenstein, Friends, Gangbangers,
Custody Disputants, Lend Me Your Passwords, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 192
(2012) (“Increasingly, evidentiary issues concerning the admission of social
media arise in both civil and criminal cases.”).
5. David M. Halbfinger & Beth Kormanik, In Digital Record, Jurors Say,
They Found Reasons to Convict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at A18. In the text
message, “gw” refers to the George Washington Bridge in New York City. Id.
6. Scott Goldstein, In Final Tweets, Murdered Dallas Woman Said She
Had Stalker, Received Death Threat, DALL. MORNING NEWS CRIME BLOG (Aug.
21, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2012/08/in-final-tweets
-murdered-dallas-woman-said-she-had-stalker-received-death-threat.html (reporting final tweets of murdered woman that included the following: “Now
Dude say He Gone KILL me. Wouldn’t be so bad if he ain’t tried 3 times before”).
7. Andy Campbell, AT&T Worker, Sends Haunting Texts Before Alleged
Murder, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/26/kevin-mashburn-att-worker-texts-murder
-bryan-middlemas_n_1916515.html.
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that guard the compound taking pictures.” These examples are
not anomalies; they represent an increasingly prevalent form of
9
proof.
Yet whether juries will, in fact, have access to the digital
artifacts of litigated controversies remains an open question.
Out-of-court statements offered to prove what they assert, even
if uttered by a testifying witness, are “hearsay” in American
courts and consequently admissible only through a hearsay ex10
ception. Exceptions are legion, but each one is limited in
11
scope. As a result, many electronic utterances—like out-ofcourt statements generally—will fail to find any conduit for
12
admissibility. Venerable hearsay exceptions will, of course,
accommodate some electronic communications, but when they
13
do it will be a product of happenstance, rather than foresight.
8. Matt Smith, Ex-SEALs, Online Gaming Maven Among Benghazi
Dead, CNN.COM (Sept. 13, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/us/
benghazi-victims.
9. See Grubman & Snyder, supra note 4, at 222 (“The explosive growth of
social networking has already had an impact on the legal world, and the importance of social networking evidence will only increase as a larger percentage of the population becomes active online.”).
10. FED. R. EVID. 801–04.
11. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803–04; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
298–99 (1973).
12. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND
STUDY RELATING TO UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE: ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY
EVIDENCE 460 (1962) (“[M]uch, probably most, of what those now dead or otherwise unavailable once said or wrote cannot be considered in court, however
much a litigant may need to have it considered to establish his claim or his
defense.”). For examples in the present context, see Versata Software Inc. v.
Internet Brands, No. 2:08-CV-313-WCB, 2012 WL 2595275, at *1, *9 (E.D.
Tex. July 5, 2012) (excluding an email documenting a meeting whose “substance . . . was an important issue during the trial,” while acknowledging that
the analysis “may appear to have a hypertechnical flavor to it”); Gulley v.
State, 2012 Ark. 368, at 7 (2012) (recounting trial court ruling excluding murder victim’s texts to defendant as hearsay); cf. Witt v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., No. CV-11-S-1031-NW, 2013 WL 832152, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2013)
(noting that “Facebook messages” offered by plaintiffs in employment discrimination lawsuit “are classic hearsay”). Commentators debate the real world
impact of the hearsay prohibition. See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule
at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 473, 504 (1992). There is evidence to support the view of most practitioners that courts take the hearsay rule seriously and routinely exclude evidence
in response to its perceived dictates. Id. at 501, 504 (concluding based on survey of published federal court opinions that the hearsay “rule is not being abolished de facto” and reporting results of survey of 169 prosecutors that show
judges take the hearsay rule seriously); Sklansky, infra note 78, at 13 (noting
that despite a proliferation of exceptions, “the rule still can show its teeth”).
13. See Grubman & Snyder, supra note 4, at 213–17 (discussing various
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After all, the drafters of the evidence rules never contemplated
14
digital communication. Consequently, even if courts get the
pertinent doctrinal analogies “right” (for example, is a search
on “WebMD” analogous to an oral consultation with a family
doctor?), there is no guarantee that those answers will sensibly
separate electronic statements that should be admissible at trial from those that should not.
Fortunately, judicial manipulation of existing doctrine is
not the only way to address the looming wave of electronic evidence. Although they tend to ossify, evidence rules are not set
15
in stone. The rules can change, and in this context, the prospects for change are real. The Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, charged with a “continuous study”
of the rules in operation, has already signaled interest in the
incipient academic debate regarding whether “the intersection
of the evidence rules and emerging [communication] technolo16
gies” necessitates changes. Even without federal action, states

hearsay exceptions that might apply to social media evidence). Most commonly, electronic utterances of a party will be admissible if offered by the opposing
party. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); see also, e.g., United States v. Harry, No.
CR10-1915-JB, 2013 WL 684646, at *30 n.24 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2013) (denying
motion to suppress text messages sent by defendant responding to questions
from friends about what happened on night of alleged sexual assault and noting that the messages constituted statements of a party).
14. See Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 341–43 (2012) (exploring outdated assumptions of drafters of present sense impression hearsay exception).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (procedure for amending rules); FED. R.
EVID. 1102 (same). See generally Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker,
Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little
Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 686 (2000) (describing tenure of the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence and criticizing the Committee’s relative
inactivity in amending the rules). The Federal Rules of Evidence were recently
revised solely to improve their style. See United States v. Darden, 688 F.3d
382, 385 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012).
16. Meeting Minutes, Federal Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 13
(Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2012-10.pdf (reporting that the members
of the Committee “expressed strong support” for holding a “symposium in the
[f]all of 2013 to consider the intersection of the evidence rules and emerging
technologies” and citing Bellin, supra note 14, and Richter, infra note 65, for
opposing views on the need for changes to federal hearsay rules); see Rice &
Delker, supra note 15, at 686; COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT
OF BUSINESS BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1998), reprinted in 181 F.R.D. 18, 162–67 (1998) (describing responsibilities of the Committee).
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could take the lead by amending their own evidence rules,
17
spurring other jurisdictions to follow suit.
With respect to the form that change should take, electronic hearsay presents a particularly appealing target for the familiar arguments in favor of easing the hearsay prohibition.
Evidence rules exclude hearsay primarily because of fears of
18
unreliability. Statements broadcast on social media or via text
messaging, however, are often quite reliable because they are
(1) uttered while events are unfolding and so reflect participants’ perceptions prior to the distorting effects of litigation
(and time), and (2) preserved in precisely the form in which
19
they were uttered. If a proper framework for admitting such
evidence over a hearsay objection can be constructed, juries
could have access to a bounty of information that, more often
20
than not, would advance the search for truth—a worthy goal.
Thus, changing communication practices present not just a
challenge to existing legal doctrine, but also an opportunity.
Scholars, judges, and policymakers can seize this “evidentiary
17. Cf. Kathrine Minotti, The Advent of Digital Diaries: Implications of
Social Networking Websites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057,
1074 (2009) (“In a world where hundreds of millions of people are actively using social networking web sites, ignoring this evidence places an impediment
on the search for truth. States should . . . be proactive in accommodating this
innovative evidence outlet.”).
18. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (“The hearsay
rule . . . is . . . grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not
be presented to the triers of fact.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay
Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319, 321–23 (2009) (chronicling hearsay dangers of “insincerity” and “misrecollection,” with the former being the primary concern of
the common law and the latter an increasing focus of modern commentary);
Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974)
(discussing “testimonial infirmities” of hearsay: “ambiguity, insincerity, faulty
perception, and erroneous memory”).
19. See infra note 41 (describing the use of mobile devices to provide realtime updates via social media outlets).
20. See infra Part I; cf. Michael Ariens, A Short History of Hearsay Reform, with Particular Reference to Hoffman v. Palmer, Eddie Morgan and Jerry Frank, 28 IND. L. REV. 183, 187 (1995) (recognizing that rules of evidence
are traditionally “based on the premise that the trier of fact (usually a jury)
was to hear evidence which allowed it to determine what really happened”);
Mike Redmayne, Rationality, Naturalism, and Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 849, 849 (“Evidence rules have many functions, but one important
function, and therefore target of evaluation, is making accurate judgments
about the facts of cases.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46
IOWA L. REV. 331, 344–46 (1961) (summarizing scholarly criticism of hearsay
rules based on their tendency to exclude evidence with significant probative
value).
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21

moment” to advance a long-stalled agenda: reducing the
much-criticized overbreadth of the hearsay prohibition in
22
American courts.
To take advantage of the opportunity presented by the
emergence of the new electronic communication norm, this Article proposes a concrete change to existing evidence law: a
novel “eHearsay” exception. The exception is designed to provide factfinders with access to a large swath of electronic evidence, while screening out the least reliable electronic state23
ments for continued exclusion. The Article makes the case for
the exception in four parts. Part I describes the changing communication norm that invites revision of America’s evidence
rules, and particularly its outdated hearsay framework. Part II
discusses previous hearsay reform proposals that culminated in
the “Statement of Recent Perception” (SRP) exception, an ex24
ception ultimately rejected by Congress in 1973. As Part III
explains, the SRP exception provides an ideal framework for a
new hearsay exception specifically tailored to the admission of
reliable electronic utterances. Part III also fleshes out the precise contours of the proposed “eSRP” or “eHearsay” exception—
a variant of the original SRP exception updated for the digital
era and fortified by a requirement that qualifying statements
be “recorded.” Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the
new hearsay exception.
By adopting a hearsay exception like the one proposed
here, judges and legislators would open the courts to terabytes
21. The quoted phrase borrows from the concept of “constitutional moments”—times when events outside the legal system set the stage for substantial changes in the law. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984).
22. For criticism of the American hearsay prohibition, see infra, Part II.
See also Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 373–84 (1992) (summarizing
criticism of hearsay rules and separating “modern” from “post-modern” critiques). Other major legal systems “manage well” without a hearsay prohibition. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 347 (discussing European legal systems, arbitration, and administrative law tribunals); id. at 344–46 (criticizing hearsay
prohibition while noting “surprising agreement” among scholars that the prohibition sweeps too broadly).
23. The proposal builds on my previous work, which argues at a more micro level that existing evidence doctrine is ill-tailored to the admission (or exclusion) of eHearsay. See Bellin, supra note 14, at 373 n.151 (raising the possibility that a “new electronic-communication hearsay exception” could address
changing communication norms).
24. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining rejection of proposed Rule 804(b)(2)).
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of electronic evidence and, at the same time, considerably
weaken the long-criticized American hearsay prohibition. The
general principle behind the proposal is that more information
25
leads to more truth. Evidence rules often push against this
26
principle, but when they do, strong justifications are required.
This Article applies that straightforward sentiment to reach a
controversial conclusion: changes in culture and technology
have led to the creation of a vast, new subset of recorded out-ofcourt statements that, while excluded by current evidence doctrine, cannot justifiably be kept from juries.
I. THE NEW COMMUNICATION NORM
The analysis begins with a description of the new electronic communication norm. Any policy prescription for addressing
this norm depends on an accurate understanding of what the
norm entails. After describing the new norm, this Part explains
why—contrary to the initial sentiments of the evidence com27
munity —its emergence necessitates changes in existing evidence doctrine.
A. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEW NORM
28

A new age of electronic communication is dawning. Instant messages, email, “status updates,” “tweets,” and text
messages are steadily replacing water cooler gossip, handwrit25. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 922 (1995) (arguing in a related context that “one can simultaneously reduce both false negatives and false positives only by bringing more information into a system” and
that “[o]ur current system throws out too much information”).
26. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403–11; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996)
(discussing evidentiary privileges, but emphasizing the general rule disfavoring them because “the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence” (quoting
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950))).
27. See infra note 65.
28. See ERIK QUALMAN, SOCIALNOMICS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA TRANSFORMS
THE WAY WE LIVE AND DO BUSINESS, at xxi (rev. ed. 2011) (“[W]e are in the
early stages of . . . [a] far-reaching revolution [that is] being driven by people
and enabled by social media.”); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Western Union, the
American Federation of Labor, Google, and the Changing Face of Privacy Advocates, 81 MISS. L.J. 971, 986 (2012) (recognizing societal movement “from
telephones to cell phones, e-mails, texts, and instant messages” and a future
where “text messaging replaces cell phone calls”). A similar description of the
new communication norm and its potential to create admissible evidence appears in my recent articles. Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford’s Confrontation
Right in a Digital Age, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 33, 35–37 (2012); Bellin, supra
note 14, at 350–57.
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29

ten letters, phone calls, and voicemail. The ascendance of electronic communication is propelled by two forces: the increasing
prevalence of handheld wireless devices, and the astonishing
popularity of “social media” Internet sites.
The primary driver of the new communication norm is the
ubiquity of handheld wireless devices capable of real-time electronic communication. Paul Ohm describes this development as
“the rise of the ‘one device,’ the convergence of a person’s computing needs into a single, portable, high-powered machine,
equipped with an always-on, high-speed connection to the Internet, and outfitted with dozens of sensors, including [camer30
as], a microphone, a GPS chip, and a digital compass.” For
now, the most ubiquitous form of the “one device” is the cell
phone. Once a novelty, cell phones have become the norm, but
talking on the phone is increasingly passé. The vast majority
(83%) of American adults own cell phones, and almost threequarters of them (73%) use their phones for “text messag31
ing” —the practice of typing and transmitting short blocks of
text directly to specified recipients. Most basically, texters
communicate their plans, estimated arrivals, and unanticipat32
ed delays to friends, family, and acquaintances. More avid us29. See Larry D. Rosen et al., The Relationship Between “Textisms” and
Formal and Informal Writing Among Young Adults, 37 COMM. RES. 420, 421
(2010) (discussing the prevalence of text messaging in American society); Katy
Steinmetz, The Grid Is Winning, TIME, Aug. 27, 2012, at 41, 42 (explaining
that in light of texting, phone calls are now “reserved for the most formal, familiar or time-sensitive communications”); Meghan Keane, Texting Overtakes
Voice in Mobile Phone Usage, WIRED, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.wired.com/
business/2008/09/texting-overtak (reporting on Nielsen survey that found that
“by the end of the second quarter of [2008], an average mobile phone subscriber placed or received 204 calls, compared with sending or receiving 357 text
messages”).
30. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1314–15 (2012); Nancy Gibbs, Your Life Is Fully Mobile, TIME
Aug. 27, 2012, at 32 (“It is hard to think of any tool, any instrument, any object in history with which so many developed so close a relationship so quickly
as we have with our [mobile] phones . . . . A typical smart[]phone has more
computing power than Apollo 11 when it landed a man on the moon.”).
31. Aaron Smith, Americans and Their Cell Phones, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT 2 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/
2011/Cell%20Phones%202011.pdf; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing June 2011 report that “there were
more than 322 million wireless devices in use in the United States”); supra
notes 28–29.
32. See Nenagh Kemp, Texting Versus Txtng: Reading and Writing Text
Messages, and Links with Other Linguistic Skills, 2 WRITING SYS. RES. 53, 63
(2010) (listing common texting abbreviations including “omw” for “on my
way”); Leslie Seifert, A ‘Linguistic Renaissance’, NEWSDAY, June 22, 2008, at
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ers keep up a near-constant dialogue with close friends and as33
sociates through rapid-fire text exchanges. Usage patterns
track demographics. Adults who text send or receive “an average of 41.5 messages on a typical day, with the median user
34
sending or receiving 10 texts daily.” Cell phone owners between the ages of 18 and 24 average 109.5 messages a day, an
impressive work rate that adds up to more than 3200 texts a
35
month. As more Americans purchase so-called smartphones—
gadgets of dazzling complexity that truly approximate Ohm’s
“one device”—these averages will only increase. Smartphone
users (including 45% of American adults and 66% of young
adults) almost all send or receive text messages (92%); 59% use
36
their smartphones to access social media sites.
Social media sites like Facebook and Twitter constitute the
second important driver of the new communication norm. These sites form the indispensable infrastructure for mass electronic communication, providing easy access to large audiences
of electronic “friends” or “followers” through home computers
37
and mobile devices. Social media sites rely on their users for
content. Without a steady stream of posts, sites like Facebook
and Twitter would be empty shells, so “they are constantly trying to get more [content], inviting [users] to update, upload,
A57 (reprinting a text conversation between two fourteen-year-olds commiserating about a recent test); infra notes 135–36.
33. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Smartphones and Texting, PEW INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT 10 (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/
Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Teens_Smartphones_and_Texting.pdf (“63% of all
teens say they exchange text messages every day with people in their lives.”).
34. Aaron Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT 2 (Sept. 19, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/~/media//
Files/Reports/2011/Americans%20and%20Text%20Messaging.pdf [hereinafter
Smith, Americans and Text Messaging]; cf. Ohm, supra note 30, at 1314–15
(noting that text messaging “obsoleted the short phone call and passed note,”
allowing “[s]tudents [to] gossip in class; spouses [to] trade grocery lists[,] and
employers (and drug lords) [to] direct underlings”).
35. Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, supra note 34, at 2.
36. Lee Rainie, Two-Thirds of Young Adults and Those with Higher Income Are Smartphone Owners, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Sept.
11,
2012),
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_
Smartphones_Sept12%209%2010%2012.pdf (“45% of American adults own
smartphones,” including 66% of those aged 18 to 29 and 59% of those aged 30
to 49); see Investor Relations, FACEBOOK, http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail
.cfm?ReleaseID=780093 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (“Mobile [monthly active
users] were 819 million as of June 30, 2013.”); Smith, Americans and Text
Messaging, supra note 34, at 3; cf. Gibbs, supra note 30, at 32 (“Three-quarters
of 25-to-29-year-olds sleep with their phones.”).
37. See infra note 43.
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post and publish.” Their efforts have been successful. Face39
book boasts more than 1 billion “active users.” Twitter reports
40
a steadily increasing average of over 400 million daily tweets.
Both sites permit users to communicate their observations 24hours-a-day, either from a stationary computer or a mobile de41
vice. In the words of a New York judge ordering Twitter to
comply with a prosecutor’s subpoena, these services have become “a significant method of communication for millions of
42
people across the world.”
Facebook’s primary feature—the “status update”—keeps
users updated on the latest happenings in their friends’ lives.
The updates range from milestones (“We are celebrating Steve’s
40th birthday today!”) to banalities (“Carey kept us up all
night . . . again”). The Facebook audience typically comments
on each update, and the poster responds, creating a mini43
conversation to supplement every post. Those not inclined to
38. See MATT IVESTER, LOL . . . OMG 17–18 (Serra Knight 2011) (“[T]he
average Facebook user posts 90 pieces of content on the site every month.”).
39. NewsRoom, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited
Oct. 13, 2013).
40. See Celebrating #Twitter7, TWITTER BLOGS (Mar. 21, 2013, 7:42 AM),
http://blog.twitter.com/2013/03/celebrating-twitter7.html (announcing that
Twitter has “well over 200 million active users creating over 400 million
Tweets each day”).
41. Free software applications enable broadcast (and receipt) of tweets
and status updates from smartphones or other variants of the “one device.”
Facebook Mobile, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/mobile (last visited Oct.
13, 2013) (offering a free download of the Facebook application for the iPhone
and Android mobile devices); Wherever You Are, Twitter Brings You Closer,
TWITTER, http://twitter.com/download (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (showcasing
the Twitter application available for download on several mobile devices); see
also Virginia Heffernan, The Medium: Being There, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 10,
2009, at 15 (reporting that the capability of mobile devices to access social
networking sites “has made it more likely that when a pal—the Jägermeisterbesotted Sean, say—writes that he’s stumbling home, he is stumbling home,
right then”).
42. People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
43. See NORA YOUNG, THE VIRTUAL SELF 24 (2012) (“[W]e increasingly
engage [in] auto-reportage, a continual ticker tape registering of how and
where you are, and what you’re doing.”); Kirsty Young, Social Ties, Social
Networks and the Facebook Experience, 9 INT’L J. EMERGING TECH. & SOC’Y
20, 24–26 (2011) (exploring adult Facebook use through surveys and reporting
that users view the service as a free and easy way to communicate “with large
numbers of people at one time”); Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens, Kindness and
Cruelty on Social Network Sites, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 22 (Nov.
9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Teens_
Kindness_Cruelty_SNS_Report_Nov_2011_FINAL_110711.pdf (reporting that
among teens, “chatting and instant messaging, commenting on their friends’
posts, and posting their own status updates” are the most common activities
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verbosity can express approval by “liking” the update, or even
one of the subsequent comments. Twitter users post “tweets”—
140-character messages—to similar effect, with “retweets” as
opposed to “likes” serving as the customary form of endorse44
45
ment. Among online adults, two-thirds (66%) use “social media platforms” like Facebook and Twitter, generating “open
46
running diaries” of their lives.
B. THE NEED FOR NEW LEGAL DOCTRINE
The startling usage statistics described above understate
the changes looming on the horizon. Skyrocketing usage rates
among younger generations foreshadow a future where every47
body uses social media and everybody texts. Scholars in all
manner of disciplines have begun to explore the implications of
48
this new electronic communication norm. Changes in communication patterns have significant societal implications, including possible consequences for social movements, journalism,
on social media sites); Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Nov. 14, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/
Reports/2011/Why-Americans-Use-Social-Media.aspx (reporting that adults
primarily use social media platforms to maintain “connections with family
members and friends (both new and old)”); Murthy, infra note 44, at 780 (describing Facebook “status updates” as “short one- or two-line messages” that
are often “trivially banal” but are “circulated as ‘news’” to “your group of
‘friends’ on the site”).
44. See Dhiraj Murthy, Twitter: Microphone for the Masses?, 33 MEDIA,
CULTURE & SOC’Y 779, 781 (2011) (describing how Twitter works).
45. Seventy-eight percent of adults use the Internet, at least occasionally.
Lee Rainie, The Internet as a Diversion and Destination, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT 6 (Dec. 2, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Internet-as
-diversion/Report.aspx.
46. QUALMAN, supra note 28, at 4; see Smith, supra note 43, at 2.; see also
Oliver, supra note 28, at 988 (“With Facebook and Twitter, Americans themselves have grown accustomed, not necessarily to government eavesdropping,
but to broadcasting virtually every detail of their lives to anyone who cares to
surf the web.”).
47. For example, while 95% of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds with cell
phones text, the number drops to 24% for those over sixty-four-years-old.
Smith, Americans and Their Cell Phones, supra note 31, at 6; see Clare Wood
et al., A Longitudinal Study of Children's Text Messaging and Literacy Development, 102 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 431, 431 (2011) (“Text messaging and the use
of mobile phones are part of the everyday lives of young people.”); Lenhart et
al., supra note 43, at 15 (“Internet use is nearly universal among American
teens . . . .”).
48. See sources cited infra note 49. Legal scholars have reacted to these
and related technological changes in other areas, such as Fourth Amendment
protections. See, e.g., Symposium, The Fourth Amendment: Views of the Future, 81 MISS. L.J. 895 (2012) (featuring thirteen articles about how the
Fourth Amendment should adapt to changes in technology).
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elections, and the physical and mental development of a young49
er generation immersed in the digital medium. The implica50
tions for courts may be equally profound.
The evidentiary treatment of electronic communications is
critically important not just because these communications are
suddenly ubiquitous, but also because they are well suited to
use in litigation. Electronic communications are both unusually
public and surprisingly durable, a combination that means they
will be easy for litigators to track down. The oft-quoted statement “privacy is dead . . . get over it” may be overheated, but it
51
stems from a new and disconcerting online reality. Electronic
communication is inherently less private than the forms of
communication it is replacing. Electronic utterances are often
intentionally (and sometimes inadvertently) broadcast to large
audiences. Even when this is not the case, these communications travel through and reside on computer servers and
transmission hubs that belong to companies, such as Facebook
and Verizon, that may not always be inclined (or able) to pro52
tect their customers’ privacy.
49. See NAOMI S. BARON, ALWAYS ON: LANGUAGE IN AN ONLINE AND MOWORLD 4–7 (2008) (discussing scholars exploration of the implications of
new communication norms); ALAN KIRBY, DIGIMODERNISM 58 (2009) (“[T]he
digimodernist text is . . . really new, something genuinely never before seen
. . . .”); Paula Devine & Katrina Lloyd, Internet Use and Psychological WellBeing Among 10-Year-Old and 11-Year-Old Children, 18 CHILD CARE IN PRAC.
5 (2012) (finding that data indicated that the use of social-networking sites
and online games related to poorer psychological well-being among girls, but
not boys); Gwenn S. O’Keeffe et al., The Impact of Social Media on Children,
Adolescents, and Families, 127 PEDIATRICS 800 (2011) (exploring the dramatic
increase in the use of social media sites by adolescents and preadolescents and
discussing the implications of their use); William Lafi Youmans & Jillian C.
York, Social Media and the Activist Toolkit: User Agreements, Corporate Interests, and the Information Infrastructure of Modern Social Movements, 62 J.
COMM. 315, 316 (2012) (citations omitted) (noting that the debate surrounding
the utility of social media in revolutions “pits advocates of the Internet’s
emancipatory promise against . . . ‘slacktivism,’ or superficial, minimal effort
in support of causes”). In August 2012 Time magazine published “The Wireless
Issue”; the centerpiece of the issue was a series of ten articles that chronicled
the “10 Ways Mobile Technology Is Changing Our World.” The Wireless Issue:
10 Ways Mobile Technology Is Changing Our World, TIME, Aug. 27, 2012,
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120827,00.html.
50. Grubman & Snyder, supra note 4, at 221–22 (emphasizing “the probability that social networking evidence will become an issue in a wide variety of
litigation”).
51. David Ticoll, Transparency: It’s Here to Stay: Get Used to It, GLOBE &
MAIL, Feb. 28, 2003, at C1, available at 2003 WLNR 14073422 (quoting Sun
Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy).
52. See Ohm, supra note 30, at 1314–15; Junichi P. Semitsu, From FaceBILE
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Electronic statements are not just exposed to larger audiences. They are also preserved in a way that is distinct from
most traditional forms of communication. As one commentator
53
puts it, “[w]hat we do in the digital world often lasts forever.”
An oral assertion, such as a comment to a coworker about a supervisor’s improper advances, will be difficult to remember
with any precision months or years after its utterance, and
even more difficult to bring before a jury in admissible form. In
addition to problems of memory, production of such communications at trial depends on the cooperation of the relatively few
persons who heard them. By contrast, electronic utterances
rarely dissipate completely. Much to the chagrin of some
speakers, an email, text, tweet, or status update can be uncovered by savvy litigators reviewing electronic files long after its
54
utterance. Memory is irrelevant. And so is cooperation. An
book to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking Privacy Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 338–42
(2011).
53. IVESTER, supra note 38, at 25; see QUALMAN, supra note 28, at 2–3
(noting that unlike other types of communications whose contents will degrade
over time and distance, with electronic communications, the “digital string is
passed intact”); see also Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing
Importance of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1556 (2010)
(explaining that a key distinction between a “Facebook status update” and the
casual utterances these status updates replace is that, unlike the stray “utterances that once floated through the air and then disappeared without a trace,”
status updates are “not only . . . stored, but also they are accessible by a company that is not a party to the conversations”); Ohm, supra note 30, at 1315
(noting that text messaging “listens more and stores more than [the types of
communications] it has replaced”); Get To Know Twitter: New User FAQ,
https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/104
TWITTER,
-welcome-to-twitter-support/articles/13920-get-to-know-twitter-new-user-faq#
(last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (“We store all your Tweets. You can . . . view up to
3200 of your most recent Tweets in your profile timeline.”).
54. See Seth P. Berman et al., Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between
“Friends”?, 53 BOS. B.J. 5, 6 (2009) (advising litigators that they can obtain
discoverable Facebook postings either from the computers of participants in
the conversation or “from Facebook itself”); Ohm, supra note 30, at 1314–15
(explaining that communicating messages on social media and via text messaging “store[s] copies of what is said on each endpoint and on network servers
in the middle, too”); Daniel de Vise, Schoolyard Face-Offs Blamed on Facebook
Taunts, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2008, at C1 (noting that Facebook comments are
“immortalized on semi-public Web pages, where they can be viewed by thousands”); Tiffany Kary, Twitter Turns Over Wall Street Protester Posts Under
Seal, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-09-14/twitter-turns-over-wall-street-protester-posts-under-seal.html (explaining, in the context of the subpoena of the suspect’s Twitter account, that
“Twitter . . . keeps as many as 3,200 posts” of its users); Jacob Leibenluft, Do
Text Messages Live Forever?, SLATE (May 1, 2008), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/05/do_text_messages_live_forever
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electronic statement, unlike an oral analogue, can be presented
to a jury with little (if any) assistance from a fact witness. A
party merely needs to display the original electronic message at
trial and can, if necessary, rely on a representative from TMobile or Facebook to lay the requisite foundation for its ad55
mission.
Attorneys and investigators are just beginning to explore
the numerous options for obtaining relevant out-of-court electronic utterances. Most obviously, they can discover this type of
evidence by searching public online forums (like Twitter) or by
happenstance when illicit actors inadvertently broadcast in56
criminating information to interested parties, such as police.
Investigators can also locate relevant text messages and social
.html (discussing the possibility of recovering deleted text messages, but also
noting that some providers delete messages fairly rapidly); Biz Stone, Tweet
Preservation, TWITTER BLOG (Apr. 14, 2010), http://blog.twitter.com/2010/04/
tweet-preservation.html (announcing Twitter’s agreement to “donate access to
the entire archive of public Tweets to the Library of Congress for preservation
and research”).
55. The message will need to be authenticated to be admissible, but can
be authenticated (if necessary) through the service provider’s records. See
United States v. Blackett, No. 11-1556, 2012 WL 1925540 (3d Cir. May 29,
2012), mandamus denied, No. 13-2544, 2013 WL 4517154 (3d Cir. Aug. 27,
2013) (noting the prosecution’s presentment of a text message through the
custodian of records from Sprint); Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368, at 12–15
(2012) (rejecting the challenge to the authentication of text messages introduced through testimony of a Verizon employee); Symonette v. State, 100 So.
3d 180, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting the authentication challenge
to the photographs of text messages saved on the defendant’s phone); United
States v. Kilpatrick, No. 10-20403, 2012 WL 3236727, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7,
2012) (holding authenticity of pager messages sent by defendant and alleged
co-conspirators was established through representative of SkyTel); State v.
Blake, 974 N.E.2d 730, 741–42 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal denied, 133 Ohio St. 3d
1490 (Nov. 28, 2012) (holding text messages were authenticated by a Cincinnati Bell representative). Attorneys will also need to navigate the lenient, but
often misapplied, “best evidence” rule. See FED. R. EVID. 1001–04.
56. E.g., Errant Text Message Lands Suspected SM Drug Dealers in Jail,
SANTA MARIA TIMES (May 30, 2012), http://santamariatimes.com/news/local/
errant-text-message-lands-suspected-sm-drug-dealers-injail/article_261a7a04
-aa86-11e1-88c0-001a4bcf887a.html; Greg Leuthen, Errant Text Message
Lands Missouri Woman in Jail on Drug Charges, KSPR NEWS (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://articles.kspr.com/2011-09-01/jail-on-drug-charges_30103988;
Jamie
Lynn, Errant Text Message Leads to Arrest of a Wanted Man, KOMONEWS.COM
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Errant-text-message
-leads-to-the-arrest-of-a-wanted-man-144534555.html; Mary Beth Quirk, Asking a State Trooper for Illegal Alcohol by Text Message Won’t Work Out Well,
CONSUMERIST (May 17, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/05/asking-a-state
-trooper-for-illegal-alcohol-by-text-message-wont-work-out-well.html;
cf.
Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that a college
president “was monitoring [the] Facebook webpage” of a student activist).
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media posts saved on suspects’ and victims’ mobile electronic
devices or on smartphones and computers left at a crime sce57
ne. For more enterprising investigators, social media sites
provide new avenues for surreptitious evidence-gathering. New
York City’s undercover officers seem particularly adept at
“friending” members of criminal gangs on Facebook and obtain58
ing access to their online conversations. Informants use Facebook too and, like undercover officers, can provide access to
their associates’ postings—free of Fourth Amendment scruti59
ny—under the aptly named “false friends” doctrine. To uncover communications by more discrete consumers of the electronic
medium, authorities can obtain a subpoena or search warrant
to compel third-party service providers such as Facebook and
60
Verizon to disclose the contents of their customers’ accounts.
57. See Symonette, 100 So. 3d at 183 (noting the prosecution’s introduction of text messages recovered from defendant’s phone); State v. James, 288
P.3d 504, 514–15 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding an officer’s warrantless inspection of a cell phone as a search incident to arrest and rejecting hearsay
challenges to admission of text messages obtained from phone); Adam M.
Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27
(2008).
58. Jose Martinez, Cop Tracked Brooklyn Gang Brower Boys by
‘Friending’ Them Online, N.Y. POST, May 31, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/
news/local/brooklyn/facebook_em_gang_busted_5ZTTJeeMG2U5BJVztT4CjN;
Aman Ali, Gang Members Arrested After Boasting of Murders on Facebook,
REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-crime
-gang-socialmedia-idUSTRE80I2CI20120119 (recounting the murder arrests
supported by evidence that the arrested “gang members, ages 15 to 21,
bragged about the shootings on the social media sites Twitter, Facebook and
YouTube”); see also Bill Archer, ‘Like’ Button Leads to Obstruction of Justice
Charge, BLUEFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 14, 2012, http://bdtonline.com/
local/x2056647583/-Like-button-leads-to-obstruction-of-justice-charge/print
(chronicling how police located a fugitive through information obtained after
his girlfriend “liked” the police department’s Facebook page); cf. Grubman &
Snyder, supra note 4, at 205–06 (summarizing the developing legal restrictions on such tactics).
59. United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (denying motion to suppress Facebook evidence obtained by police
through cooperating witness who was the defendant’s Facebook “friend”). See
generally On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1952) (holding that
the “use of informers, accessories, accomplices, [and] false friends” to obtain
information about suspects does not implicate the Fourth Amendment).
60. See Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (noting the issuance of a warrant for defendant’s Facebook account); Gulley, 2012 Ark. 368, at 3–4 (rejecting the challenge to the prosecutor’s obtaining of defendant’s text messages
through a subpoena to Verizon and the admission of the texts through testimony of a Verizon employee); Brief of Appellant at 9, Blackett, 2012 WL
1925540 (No. 11-1556), 2011 WL 6935515, at *9 (noting that the text message
introduced against defendant was “introduced into evidence by the custodian
of records for the service company—Sprint”); BRIONES & TAGVORYAN, supra
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In fact, despite often (understandably) breathless media
coverage to the contrary, there is nothing legally noteworthy
about obtaining private communications from social media sites
61
or cellphone service providers. If relevant information exists,
the government is entitled to use judicial process to obtain it—
as are private litigants—whether the information is held by a
private citizen, Citizens & Southern National Bank, or Face62
book. The only thing that is changing is that investigators are
starting to realize the breathtaking evidentiary potential of
these electronic sources. Facebook quietly maintains a website
(the “Law Enforcement Online Requests System”) for “law enforcement officials seeking records from Facebook” and provides alternative links for “private party requests, including
63
requests from civil litigants and criminal defendants.” With
note 4, at 35–38; Semitsu, supra note 52, at 360; Jeffrey Bellin, Finding Evidence on Facebook, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Nov. 1, 2011), http://lawprofessors
.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2011/11/finding-evidence-on-facebook.html.
61. See People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 513 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012);
Wendy Ruderman, Court Prompts Twitter to Give Data to Police in Threat
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at A14 (reporting on Twitter’s compliance with
court order to provide subscriber information); Joseph Ax, Twitter Surrenders
Occupy Protester’s Tweets, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/09/14/twitter-occupy-idUSL1E8KE6QN20120914.
62. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976) (rejecting the
argument that the Fifth Amendment “serve[s] as a general protector of privacy”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–38 (1976) (holding that the enforcement of a government subpoena directed to the depositor’s records did not
violate the depositor’s Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 709–10 (1974) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(endorsing “ancient” maxim that where no privilege applies, “the public . . .
has a right to every man’s evidence”); Juror No. One v. Superior Court, 142
Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 161–62 (Ct. App. 2012) (upholding courts’s authority to subpoena juror’s Facebook posts); Grubman & Snyder, supra note 4, at 189–97
(summarizing the application of the discovery rules to social media evidence).
63. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, https://www
.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines (last visited Oct. 17, 2013); see also
Jeff John Roberts, A New U.S. Law-Enforcement Tool: Facebook Searches,
REUTERS (July 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/us
-facebook-idUSTRE76B49420110712 (reporting that “U.S. law-enforcement
agencies are increasingly obtaining warrants to search Facebook, often gaining detailed access to users' accounts without their knowledge”); Law Enforcement & Third-Party Matters: How Does Facebook Work with Law Enforcement?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/473784375984502 (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013) (“We may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas,
court orders, or other requests (including criminal and civil matters) if we
have a good faith belief that the response is required by law.”); Transparency
Report, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/information-requests/2012/
jul-dec (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (reporting the receipt of 815 domestic law
enforcement requests for user information in last six months of 2012, and
compliance with 69% of the requests).
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respect to cell phones, law enforcement agencies already routinely obtain location information for subscribers’ mobile devices, and experts believe the “next surge in surveillance is text
64
messaging.”
Given the bounty of discoverable electronic evidence generated by the new communication norm and the potential for
much of this evidence to constitute a compelling form of proof,
the obvious evidentiary question becomes how to funnel these
communications to fact-finders. The doctrinal status quo is, of
course, one option, and seemingly the preferred option for the
65
few commentators who have weighed in so far. But it is not at
all clear how evidence rules designed for an era of oral communication, water-cooler gossip, quill, and parchment will apply in
a new world of digital communication—and there is little reason to think that we will like the results.
At an intuitive level, it is clear that evidence doctrine, and
specifically the rules governing the admissibility of out-of-court
statements, should change in response to changing communica64. Massimo Calabresi, The Phone Knows All, TIME, Aug. 27, 2012, at 30–
31 (quoting chief of detectives in Rockland County, New York saying that
“[t]here is a mobile device connected to every crime scene” and reporting the
belief of “industry experts” that “the next surge in [law enforcement] surveillance is text messaging”); see John P. Mello Jr., DEA Can't Get Around
iMessage Encryption Roadblocks, MACNEWSWORLD (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www
.macnewsworld.com/story/77717.html (describing the complaints of the Drug
Enforcement Agency regarding its inability, despite court order, to obtain text
messages sent through a specific texting application).
65. See Susan W. Brenner, Communications, Technology, and Present
Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 255, 261 (2011) (asserting
that “we will have little difficulty adapting the [present sense impression] exception so that it can accommodate our use of social networking and whatever
communication technologies evolve in the future”); Orenstein, supra note 4, at
221 (arguing that the “byzantine hearsay structure works well” in adapting to
social media communication, with the possible exception of the present sense
impression exception); Liesa L. Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!: E-Hearsay,
the Present Sense Impression, and the Case for Caution in the Rulemaking
Process, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1657, 1661 (2012) (contending that the “[e]xisting
hearsay doctrine was designed to deal with human communication . . . in
whatever form it may take” and the “creation and preservation of hearsay in
electronic form, therefore, provides no basis for charging in to refashion timehonored hearsay principles”); Megan Uncel, Comment, “Facebook Is Now
Friends with the Court”: Current Federal Rules and Social Media Evidence, 52
JURIMETRICS J. 43, 56 (2011) (arguing that “social media evidence can be presented within the current Federal Rules of Evidence and new rules are unnecessary”); Randy Wilson, Admissibility of Web-Based Data, 52 THE ADVOCATE
31, 31 (2010) (“At first blush, the decades-old evidence rules would seem illsuited for the task of establishing admissibility of electronic evidence. Yet,
these rules have proven to be surprisingly flexible . . . .”).
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66

tion norms. After all, the hearsay rules, and particularly the
hearsay exceptions, identify subsets of out-of-court statements
that are sufficiently reliable to be admissible without contemporaneous cross-examination. Assumptions about the way peo67
ple communicate drive this process. If the assumptions
change—as they must when communication norms change—
reliability assessments change as well. A set of rules that arose
at a time when people communicated in a completely different
manner (i.e., in person, by letter, and through landline phones)
is unlikely to account for the dangers or benefits of out-of-court
statements communicated on social media sites, in Internet
chat rooms, and via text messaging.
Viewed from the perspective of individual hearsay exceptions, the dilemma comes into sharp relief. Courts and litigants
are already facing difficult questions as the dusty hearsay rules
clash with digital communication, and many more are on the
horizon:
• Do CAPITALIZED text messages constitute “excit68
ed utterances”?
69
• Are status updates “present sense impressions”?
66. See Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934,
937 (2d Cir. 1927) (Learned Hand, J.) (decrying as “especially disastrous” the
“sluggishness of the law” in creating a business records hearsay exception in
response to the changing “routine of modern affairs”); UNIF. R. EVID. 1 (1999),
(recognizing that “[s]ocietal changes, advances in . . . science and improvements in information technology have exposed many problematic evidentiary
situations routinely faced by lawyers and judges” and an “increasing” trend
where existing “rules fail to fit into a new environment, or alternatively, if
they fit, they produce measurable inequity”); Judson Falknor, The Hearsay
Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 UCLA L. REV. 43, 44 (1954) (quoting Professor
Charles T. McCormick’s view that as exceptions to the hearsay rule “seemed
most needed in the first half of the eighteen hundreds” including an exception
for “book entries,” they “crystallized into exceptions to the hearsay rule”).
67. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 14, at 333 (explaining how assumptions of
an oral communication norm drove adoption of the present sense impression
exception); cf. Orenstein, supra note 4, at 198 (highlighting the present sense
impression exception as one example where rules might require change).
68. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (recognizing a hearsay exception for “excited
utterances”); see also Campbell, supra note 7 (chronicling text messages sent
by assault victim, who subsequently died of injuries, that included the text: “‘I
NEED[] YOU TO CALL ME AN AMBULANCE[;]I HAVE BEEN ATTACKED”
and recounted details of the assault); Gregory Connolly, York Call Center
Among First in Nation to Offer Text-to-911 Service, WILLIAMSBURG YORKTOWN
DAILY, Dec. 11, 2012, http://wydaily.com/2012/12/11/york-call-center-among
-first-in-nation-to-offer-text-to-911-service (reporting adoption of technology
that permits people to text 911 for emergency response).
69. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (recognizing a hearsay exception for “present
sense impressions”); see e.g., Bellin, supra note 14.
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•

Can WebMD searches be “statements made for
70
medical diagnosis”?
• Do routine work-related emails qualify as “business
71
records”?
• Does a “retweet” or “like” constitute an “adoptive
72
admission”?
The only honest answers to these and the host of related
questions are: “maybe,” “sometimes,” or, perhaps most candidly, “we’ll see.” This uncertainty is itself a concern in a world
where most cases are resolved prior to trial by guilty plea or
73
settlement. Ex ante clarity as to the admissibility of evidence
is critical in such a system, whose legitimacy depends on the
idea that litigants can accurately forecast trial outcomes, and
74
thus conform pretrial settlement to those forecasts. Accuracy,
not certainty, however, could be the primary casualty of doctri70. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (recognizing a hearsay exception for certain
“statements made for medical diagnosis”); id. at 803(3) (hearsay exception for
certain statements of emotional, sensory, or physical conditions).
71. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B) (recognizing a hearsay exception for records
“kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business”); see, e.g.,
Abdelrahim v. Guardsmark, No. B207270, 2009 WL 3823283, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009) (rejecting hearsay challenge to email detailing alleged cause for
termination on the ground that email fell within the business records exception because the author regularly wrote emails as part of her job).
72. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (recognizing a hearsay exception for statements against an opposing party where that party adopted the statement); see,
e.g., Molly D. McPartland, An Analysis of Facebook “Likes” and Other Nonverbal Internet Communication Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming November 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256936 (supporting the view that Facebook likes
should be considered adoptive admissions and excluded from hearsay objections); Allison L. Pannozzo, Uploading Guilt: Adding a Virtual Records Exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1695, 1706 (2012) (collecting cases discussing whether forwarding email constitutes an adoptive
admission and noting analogy to Facebook “liking”).
73. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1402, 1407 (2012) (citing Department of Justice calculations for the proposition that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state convictions are the result of
guilty pleas” and echoing commentators’ contention that “plea bargaining is
. . . not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system”); Thomas H. Cohen & Lynn Langton, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in
State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1 (Apr. 9, 2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj
.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=554 (reporting survey result of state courts
that “trials . . . accounted for about 3% of all tort, contract, and real property
dispositions in general jurisdiction courts”).
74. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (discussing literature that largely justifies a system of plea bargains and settlements on the basis of a “shadow-oftrial” model).
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nal inertia. Forcing courts to apply an outdated hearsay
framework to a new form of evidence will inevitably keep reliable out-of-court utterances from juries, decreasing the accuracy
of their verdicts. At the same time, courts will be tempted to
contort existing evidence rules either to admit reliable electronic utterances that do not fit traditional hearsay exceptions, or
exclude unreliable electronic utterances that do. Errors involving the admission or exclusion of electronic utterances are already common; many of the examples discussed below in this
Article are drawn from cases where trial courts sensibly, but
erroneously, admitted electronic utterances over a hearsay objection, and appellate courts—reluctant to get in the way of
75
good evidence—deemed the error “harmless.” This is likely the
real status quo; increasing slippage between what the evidence
rules allow and what (some) courts admit, as the rules fail to
track individual judges’ views of what constitutes reliable electronic evidence.
A final consideration is that courts cannot fully control jurors’ access to publicly available online information, like posts
on Twitter and (to some degree) Facebook. Individual jurors—
able to access these sites on their smartphones—will be tempted to fill obvious evidentiary gaps through their own online
76
sleuthing. A system that refuses to allow electronic evidence
75. See, e.g., United States v. Blackett, 481 F. App’x 741, 742 (3d Cir.
2012) (deeming apparently erroneous admission of text message “harmless”);
People v. Logan, No. 303269, 2012 WL 3194222, at *6 (Mich. App. 2012) (ruling that the “text messages [admitted at trial] were hearsay to which no exception applied,” but deeming their admission harmless error); Funches v.
State, No. 57654, 2012 WL 436635, at *1 (Nev. 2012) (agreeing that a text
message implicating defendant should not have been admitted, but declaring
it “harmless” as defendant admitted the truth of the information on his own);
cases cited infra note 177; cf. Commonwealth v. Koch, 615 Pa. 612, 44 A.3d
1147 (2012), rev’g 39 A.3d 996, 1002, 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (holding that
trial court erred in admitting text messages sent from the defendant’s phone
and granting a new trial); Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to Address the Challenges of Electronically
Stored Information in Civil Litigation, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 176 (2010)
(“[T]he flexibility of the rules to adapt and address the challenges of [electronically stored information] does not necessarily mean that amendments are not
needed. . . . [S]ome of the changes wrought by technology have no common law
analog, making it difficult for judges to resolve them.”).
76. See Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial
Jury in the Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 8–17 (2012) (recounting examples of social media use during trials); John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(“The
use of BlackBerrys and iPhones by jurors gathering and sending out infor-
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through the front door may find it filtering into the jury room
through other portals.
In sum, leaving the courts to apply existing evidence doctrine to digital communication is an option, but it comes at a
cost. Litigants will face uncertainty as to the admissibility of
their electronic evidence; judges will be tempted to fill the void
between the rules and intuition by distorting doctrine; jurors
may seek online what they do not receive in court; and reliable
evidence will be kept from juries. Given this reality, policymakers, judges, and evidence scholars should, at a minimum, explore alternative approaches, particularly when the status quo
takes the form of an antiquated hearsay framework that has
long been crying out for reform.
II. REFORMING THE HEARSAY RULES
As the previous Part suggests, the greatest obstacle to any
effort to introduce online chatter, social media posts, email, and
text messages into evidence at trial is the venerable hearsay
77
prohibition. The now-codified prohibition, with its many discrete exceptions, is the most distinctive feature of American ev78
79
idence law. It is also the most controversial. While evidence
mation about cases is wreaking havoc on trials around the country. . . .”); Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go off Track, REUTERS (Dec 8,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-jurors-idUSTRE6
B74Z820101208 (reporting that despite warnings, jury members continue to
search for case information online through search engines and social media,
and there has even been at least one instance of a jury member contacting a
defendant through MySpace); cf. Juror No. One v. Superior Court, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 151, 151 (Ct. App. 2012) (proceeding for juror misconduct after juror
posted Facebook status updates regarding day-to-day events of trial). In an
informal survey, jurors self-reported some temptation to do Internet research
during trial, but claimed not to have succumbed. Eve & Zuckerman, supra, at
21–23.
77. Another obstacle is authentication, but authentication is likely to fade
as a unique difficulty for admitting electronic communication as judges and
litigants become familiar with the technology involved. See FED. R. EVID.
901(a); Orenstein, supra note 4, at 222 (commenting that like written documents, electronic documents can be forged, but there are likewise appropriate
verification techniques); see also supra note 55.
78. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801–04; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
298–99 (1973) (recognizing that “[t]he hearsay rule . . . has long been recognized and respected by virtually every State”); 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1365, at 28 (Chadbourn ed. 1974) (describing hearsay prohibition as the “most characteristic rule of the AngloAmerican law of evidence—a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial,
the greatest contribution of that eminently practical legal system”); David
Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 S. CT. REV. 1, 28 (characterizing
modern hearsay framework as “a strict rule of evidentiary exclusion, accom-
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scholars actively shaped evidence doctrine over the years, the
current hearsay framework exists in spite of, not because of,
their efforts. In fact, the history of American hearsay rules can
be characterized as a series of efforts by eminent commentators
and code drafters to weaken the hearsay prohibition, and the
81
prohibition’s surprising resiliency.
To strengthen the case for an eHearsay exception and foreshadow its contours, this Part presents a (very) brief history of
the American hearsay prohibition, highlighting the recent efforts of would-be hearsay reformers, and the culmination of
those efforts in a proposed, but ultimately rejected, federal
hearsay exception for “Statements of Recent Perception.” The
largely forgotten SRP exception is surprisingly well suited to
regulating the admission of electronic utterances and could
serve as a sturdy base from which to craft an alternative to the
status quo: a new “eHearsay” exception.
A. THE HEARSAY PROHIBITION
American evidence rules prohibit the introduction of any
out-of-court statement offered as proof of the “matter asserted”
82
by the out-of-court speaker, or “declarant.” This “hearsay”
prohibition applies even to the out-of-court statements of wit83
nesses who testify at trial. Thus, if I post a Facebook status
update that says, “my boss hit me this morning for being late,”
panied by a long and confusing set of exceptions”).
79. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 184 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring) (noting “disagreement among scholars over the value of excluding hearsay and the trend toward liberalization of the exceptions”); Michael D.
Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1308 (2011) (lampooning “the Swiss cheese-like rule
against hearsay with its thirty or so exceptions”); Falknor, supra note 66, at
43–45 (summarizing views of Wigmore, McCormick, and Professor Edmund M.
Morgan to support changes to hearsay doctrine); Michael S. Pardo, Testimony,
82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 148 (2007) (criticizing “the Byzantine structure of the
[hearsay] rules” and questioning whether “the rule contributes to or detracts
from just results”); Sklansky, supra note 78, at 20 (describing federal rules’
prohibition of hearsay as “a categorical rule riddled with a labyrinthine series
of exceptions”).
80. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (acknowledging
the influence of the “academic community” in shaping the Federal Rules of Evidence); Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered:
Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 950–51 (2006) (discussing the “distinguished history” of evidence scholarship in shaping evidence
law).
81. See infra Part II.A.
82. FED. R. EVID. 801–02.
83. See, e.g. id. at 801(c); VA. R. EVID. 801(c); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200.
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a prosecutor cannot later use that update to prove that my
boss, in fact, hit me. The out-of-court statement is hearsay and
inadmissible (absent a hearsay exception) even if I testify in
court. In practice, the prohibition is designed to force the parties to bring the most knowledgeable witnesses to court and rely on their live testimony, rather than written affidavits or se84
cond-hand accounts.
85
Modern hearsay law traces its roots to the early 1700s.
The English common law exclusion of out-of-court statements
began to emerge about that time, grounded in the notion that
“statements used as testimony must be made where the maker
86
can be subjected to cross-examination.” This justification still
resonates with the modern conception that an adversary system requires live testimony, not out-of-court statements, as its
87
inputs. Live witnesses testify under oath at a public trial, un88
der the gaze of interested observers, judge, and jury. These
witnesses are subject to cross-examination—the “greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”—which probes
for untoward influence by the sponsoring party, or bias and
89
other flaws on the part of the witness.
84. Sklansky, supra note 78, at 11.
85. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A
View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1172, 1187 (1996) (noting there are “examples of hearsay appearing in the Old Bailey Sessions Papers from 1678 into the 1730s”).
86. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1364 at 16 (Chadbourn ed. 1974); Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking
Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1891–92 (2012) (discussing uncertainty regarding hearsay prohibition in English and early American courts);
Langbein, supra note 85, at 1172 (contending, contrary to Wigmore, that the
hearsay rule “hardened only in the last decades of the eighteenth century”);
see also Mirjan Damaška, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV.
425, 434–39 (1992) (discussing analogues to hearsay prohibition in European
law).
87. MODEL CODE EVID. 218 (1942) (noting that “the hearsay rule is the
child of the adversary system”); Mueller, supra note 22, at 378 (explaining
that “[t]he central premise of the hearsay doctrine is that live testimony is
preferable to remote statements”).
88. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (noting as one
of the reasons to exclude hearsay, that “[o]ut-of-court statements . . . are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker
with the solemnity of his statements”); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242–43 (1895) (professing the value of a live witness so the jury “may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief”).
89. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)); Charles T. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REV.
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The necessary corollary to the sentiments expressed above
is that an adversary process is not so well equipped to ferret
out spurious out-of-court statements. Out-of-court speakers
rarely speak under oath and need not fear perjury prosecution
or even particularly severe moral condemnation for lying. More
significantly, cross-examination, the critical adversarial tool for
unearthing hidden flaws, is blunted when the real subject of
90
the examination is absent from court.
The American hearsay prohibition thus stands on firm theoretical ground. Yet skeptics persist. As will quickly become
apparent, reformers traditionally focus on the prohibition’s two
most dubious facets. First, why does the prohibition apply to
the out-of-court statements of testifying witnesses who can, in
fact, be cross-examined? Second, encouraging parties to bring
live witnesses to trial may be a worthy goal, but the prohibition
extends to out-of-court statements of declarants who are deceased or otherwise unavailable to testify. Applying the hearsay prohibition to statements by unavailable witnesses deprives juries of evidence that, while imperfect, is often the best
the circumstances allow.
B. THE MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
In recent history, the most direct assault on the hearsay
prohibition came in the 1942 “Model Code of Evidence” promulgated by the American Law Institute (ALI). The Model Code
represented the studied efforts of the era’s evidence luminaries
91
to codify the unruly, judge-made evidence law of the time. The
Model Code’s drafters had a second objective as well—to work a
92
“radical change[]” in the common law hearsay prohibition. The
drafters derided “the law governing hearsay” as a “conglomeration of inconsistencies” with little thematic purpose, adding
that “[t]he courts by multiplying exceptions [to the prohibition]
reveal their conviction that relevant hearsay evidence normally
has real probative value, and is capable of valuation by a ju573, 576 (1947) (asserting that “the major safeguard of the veracity of testimony and its main factor of superiority to out-of-court statements is its subjection to the test of cross-examination”).
90. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
91. See MODEL CODE EVID., at III, XII (1942) (listing members of ALI
“Committee on Evidence,” including Learned Hand, Mason Ladd, Charles
McCormick, and the reporter, Edmund Morgan, and noting that Wigmore
served as “Chief Consultant”).
92. Id. at III, Comment to Rule 503, at 232; id. at 47 (“[I]t is in the chapter on Hearsay that the Code departs most widely from the common law.”).
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93

The Model Code’s drafters attempted to transform the
hearsay prohibition into a rule of necessity. Section 503 of the
Model Code made hearsay admissible whenever the declarant
94
is “unavailable as a witness.” The Code also made hearsay
admissible whenever the declarant was “present and subject to
95
cross-examination.” As a result, under the Model Code, hearsay would almost always be admissible, save for circumstances
where the proponent of a statement could procure the declarant’s live testimony, but declined to do so. In part because of
this “radical attitude toward hearsay reform,” no state adopted
96
the Model Code. Some jurisdictions, such as California,
97
spurned it with a “vehemence bordering upon anger.”
C. THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
In 1953, evidence scholars again tried to dilute the Ameri98
can hearsay prohibition. Building from the wreckage of the
93. Id. at 223–24 (1942); cf. Edmund M. Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12
WASH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1937) (scorning the exceptions and inconsistencies of the
hearsay rule).
94. MODEL CODE EVID. 503 (1942).
95. Id. at 231–32; Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (1987) (describing the Model Code’s approach to hearsay); see also Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477,
480 (1998). With respect to the admission of hearsay by an unavailable declarant, the Model Code mirrored older views, including those of Jeremy Bentham.
See James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View
of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 945
(1962).
96. Park, supra note 95, at 53; see Charles W. Quick, Hearsay, Excitement,
Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L.
REV. 204, 217 (1960); Sklansky, supra note 78, at 20 (2009) (“The hearsay provisions of the Model Code of Evidence helped ensure that it was never adopted
anywhere.”) The Code’s sometimes impenetrable syntax also deserves some of
the blame. See, e.g., MODEL CODE EVID. 306(3), at 513; Charles T. McCormick,
Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEX. L. REV. 559, 559–60
(1955) (attributing rejection of Model Code to perception that it was “overradical in its reforms, especially in opening the door too far for the admission
of hearsay” and that it was “over-academic in its form of expression”).
97. Chadbourn, supra note 95, at 945.
98. See id. at 946 (recognizing Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) as “a substitute” for
the Benthamite rejection of the hearsay prohibition proposed by the Model
Rules); see also 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5005 (2d ed. 2005) (opining darkly
that “[t]he flowers had hardly wilted on the grave of the Model Code when the
A.B.A. began searching for a new bride to wear the weeds of reform”); Quick,
supra note 96, 214–15 (contrasting the Uniform Rules’ moderate attempt to
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Model Code, and in consultation with the Code’s drafters, a reconstituted committee of prominent jurists and scholars drafted
99
the “Uniform Rules of Evidence.” Designed in part to soften
aspects of the Model Code that were “too far-reaching and drastic for present day acceptance,” the Uniform Rules left the traditional hearsay prohibition intact, but proposed a novel and
100
potentially expansive new hearsay exception. Awkwardly titled “Statements Admissible on Grounds of Necessity Generally,” Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) excepted from the hearsay prohibition:
[A] statement [of an unavailable witness] narrating, describing or explaining an event or condition which the judge finds was made by the
declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by
him and while his recollection was clear, and was made in good faith
101
prior to the commencement of the action.

The Commentary to the rule acknowledged that the exception was “new” but justified it as meeting a “vital need” to “prevent miscarriage of justice resulting from the arbitrary exclusion of evidence which is worthy of consideration, when it is the
102
best evidence available.” In concert with the Uniform Rules’
treatment of out-of-court statements of testifying witnesses as
103
non-hearsay, Rule 63(4)(c) again promised to substantially
104
The Uniform
unravel the American hearsay prohibition.
alter existing hearsay doctrine with the Model Code’s effort to “knock down all
barriers to the admission of . . . hearsay”).
99. UNIF. R. EVID. 161–62 (noting that the drafters of the Uniform Rules,
including Mason Ladd and Charles McCormick, used the Model Code “as a basis from which to work” and consulted with Professor Morgan and, through
him, the ALI Committee that drafted the Model Code).
100. Id. at 161. The drafters of the Uniform Rules explicitly distanced
themselves from the Model Code. Id. at 198 cmt. (explaining that their approach was a “drastic variation from the A.L.I. Model Code”); cf. FED. R. EVID.
art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note (noting that the “draftsmen of
the Uniform Rules chose a . . . more conventional position” than the drafters of
the Model Code with respect to hearsay); Mason Ladd, Witnesses, 10 RUTGERS
L. REV. 523, 523 (1956). McCormick characterized the Uniform Rules’ approach as a “strategic retreat.” Charles T. McCormick, Hearsay, 10 RUTGERS
L. REV. 620, 624 (1956).
101. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c), at 199–200.
102. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4), at 200 cmt.; McCormick, supra note 100, at 624
(describing the rule as “an attempt to answer a need which many judges and
writers have expressed for a wider use of declarations of persons deceased or
otherwise unavailable”); M.C. Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of
Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224, 253–54 (1960) (supporting 63(4)(c)).
103. See UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1), at 198 (removing from the hearsay prohibition any “statement previously made by a person who is present . . . and available for cross examination”).
104. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 12, at 459 (describing the
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Rules, however, “were only slightly more successful than the
Model Code,” achieving lasting acceptance only in Kansas, the
home state of the chairman of the Committee that drafted the
105
rules.
D. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Evidence reformers tried one last time to liberalize the
hearsay prohibition in the next, and most successful, effort to
create a uniform system of American evidence law: the Federal
Rules of Evidence adopted by Congress in 1975 and shortly
106
thereafter in most state jurisdictions. While purporting to
adopt “the approach to hearsay . . . of the common law,” the
Federal Rules’ drafters included an exception unknown to the
common law, Rule 804(b)(2), “Statement of Recent Perception.”
This rule, which borrowed heavily from Uniform Rule 63(4)(c),
excepted from the hearsay prohibition:
A statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the
declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollec-

rule as “clearly a new exception of broad scope and of large importance” and
endorsing its adoption in California; the Commission rejected the suggestion of
its consultant); Quick, supra note 96, at 215 (forecasting that among the innovations in the Uniform Rules, Rule 63(4)(c), “the most far reaching exception,”
will “be under especially heavy attack”).
105. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 98, § 5005 (explaining that
Kansas enacted the Uniform Rules “pretty much as is,” New Jersey adopted
them with significant modifications, and Utah adopted them “only to turn
around in 1983 and adopt a new set of rules based on the Federal Rules of Evidence”); Michael S. Ariens, The Law of Evidence and the Idea of Progress, 25
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 853, 863 & n.47 (1992) (explaining that “the Uniform Rules
had only slightly more impact” than the Model Code since “only four jurisdictions adopted [versions of] the Uniform Rules”: Kansas, New Jersey, Utah,
and the Virgin Islands). The Virgin Islands followed Utah in switching to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, essentially leaving Kansas as the only state with
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See Thomas v. People, No. 2010–0087, 2012
WL 1522263, at *4 n.11 (V.I. May 2, 2012) (noting that in 2010, the Virgin Islands “repealed the local URE and replaced it with the Federal Rules of Evidence”); State v. Simpson, No. 105,182, 2011 WL 4563106, at *6 (Kan. App.
Sept 30, 2011), review granted (Mar. 9, 2012) (“Our Kansas Rules of Evidence
came from the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence . . . .”); McCormick, supra note
96, at 560 (“[T]rial judge, Spencer A. Gard of Kansas, was . . . chairman.”).
106. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.8 (1974) (referencing new rules); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Declarations Against Social Interest:
The (Still) Embarrassingly Neglected Hearsay Exception, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1427, 1445 (1996) (noting “the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
their subsequent adoption in most states”).
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107

The proposed rule was approved by the Supreme Court,
108
but rejected by Congress. The House Judiciary Committee
explained that it could not endorse this “new and unwarranted
hearsay exception of great potential breadth” because it “did
not believe that statements of the type referred to bore suffi109
cient guarantees of trustworthiness.” Congress, being the final word on the matter, prevailed. Consequently, the Federal
110
Rules and, with four exceptions, the evidence codes governing
state jurisdictions (which largely mirror the enacted federal
rules) contain no provision analogous to the SRP exception.
Although these evidence codes contain numerous hearsay exceptions distilled from the common law, including, in many
cases, an ill-defined “residual” exception intended for use in
111
“rare” and “exceptional” circumstances, adherents to the sta107. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 377–78 (1969). As
with the other exceptions in Rule 804, proposed Rule 804(b)(2) only applied if
the declarant was “unavailable.” Id. After the proposed rule was benched, its
number was given to the exception for dying declarations. See FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(2).
108. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 6 (1973) (explaining rejection of proposed
Rule 804(b)(2)).
109. Id.
110. Hawaii and Wisconsin adopted Rule 804(b)(2) verbatim. See HAW. R.
EVID. § 804(b)(5) (2012); WISC. STAT. § 908.045(2) (2012). Wyoming adopted
the exception for civil, but not criminal, cases. See WYO. R. EVID. § 804(b)(5)
(2012). Kansas continued to apply a precursor to Rule 804(b)(2) based on Uniform Rule 63(4)(c). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d)(3) (2012). New Mexico
adopted the exception, but later abandoned it. See State v. Ross, 919 P.2d
1080, 1086 (N.M. 1996).
111. Federal Rule of Evidence 807 provides a “residual exception” for hearsay that possesses “guarantees of trustworthiness” equivalent to those in the
other enumerated exceptions. FED. R. EVID. 807; cf. Dallas Cnty. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) (applying analogous
residual exception prior to Federal Rules); 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, at T-214–19 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (identifying twenty-six states with statutory evidence codes that follow the federal model with respect to a residual exception
and fourteen states that do not). Relying on the rule’s legislative history,
courts emphasize that the residual exception should “be used only rarely, in
truly exceptional cases.” United States v. El-Mezain 664 F.3d 467, 498 (5th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United Tech. Corp. v.
Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929
F.2d 901, 907–08 (2d Cir. 1991); Myrna S. Raeder, A Response to Professor
Swift, 76 MINN. L. REV. 507, 514 & n.23 (1992) (reporting results of survey of
reported federal cases that found about fourteen cases a year over a fifteenyear period where the residual exception was successfully invoked, including
cases where it was relied on as an alternative ground for admission, a rate
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tus quo have largely turned back modern efforts to liberalize
112
hearsay doctrine.
III. A NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR ELECTRONIC
STATEMENTS OF RECENT PERCEPTION
One explanation for the failure of the Statement of Recent
Perception (SRP) exception is that the proposed exception came
113
a half-century too early. With a few modifications, the exception provides a robust grounding for a new “eSRP” or
“eHearsay” exception tailored to the changes in modern communication norms described in Part I. In concert with the increasing prevalence and preservation of electronic utterances,
this largely forgotten piece of evidence history could open
American courtrooms to reliable records of electronic communications and (finally) ease the heavy hand of the American hearsay prohibition.
This Part sketches the contours of an eSRP exception—
modeled on the original SRP exception—that would admit, over
a hearsay objection, a broad array of electronic (and even non114
statements that are sufficiently reliable to be
electronic)
placed before the finder of fact. For reasons outlined in the subsequent text, the proposed exception actually consists of two
exceptions: one appended to Federal Rule of Evidence 801
(statements of testifying witnesses), and the other to Federal
Professor Raeder found “clearly high given that the exception was intended to
cover the ‘exceptional’ case”). Even if courts more broadly embraced the exception, its vague and amorphous nature renders it unsuitable to regulate
eHearsay. See id. at 516–17 (decrying routine reliance on the residual exception as permitting “total erosion of the hearsay rule by judicial discretion” and
resulting in “the worst of all worlds for litigators who must decide which cases
to try by evaluating the potentially admissible evidence”).
112. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298–99 (1973); Sklansky,
supra note 78, at 28; Mueller, supra note 22, at 369 (explaining that the “modernists” who “proposed simplified rules aimed at admitting more hearsay . . .
did not prevail, as can be seen in the adoption and spread of the Federal
Rules, which retain the exclusionary principle and detailed categorical exceptions”); Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for
the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) (explaining that the federal hearsay exceptions constitute a “synthesis” of “the
many exceptions to the hearsay rule developed by the common law”).
113. Cf. McCormick, supra note 100, at 631 (expressing hope that “some
decades hence,” a broader reform to the hearsay prohibition would emerge
that allows hearsay to be introduced, and permits jurors the “responsibility for
valuing such evidence only for what it is worth”).
114. See infra Part III.F.
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Rule of Evidence 804 (statements of unavailable declarants).
Precise language for the proposed exception appears below.
Italicized text represents additions to the current Federal Rules
of Evidence. Non-italicized text (including bolded text) is unchanged from the existing federal rules, but included, where
necessary, to provide context.
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay – When the Declarant Is Unavailable as a Witness
...
(b) The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
...
(5) Recorded Statement of Recent Perception. A recorded communication that describes or explains an event or condition recently perceived by
the declarant, but not including: (A) a statement made in contemplation of
litigation, or to a person who is investigating, litigating, or settling a potential or existing claim; or (B) an anonymous statement.

Rule 801. . . . Exclusions from Hearsay
. . . (d) A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement, and the statement: . . . (D) would qualify as a Recorded Statement of Recent Perception under Rule 804(b)(5) if the declarant were unavailable.

The proposed rule borrows heavily from the original SRP
exception, but also modifies that rule to a significant degree.
Piece-by-piece analysis justifying both the borrowed provisions
and the new language follows.
A. THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DECLARANT’S UNAVAILABILITY
OR PRESENCE AT TRIAL
“the declarant is unavailable as a witness” or “[t]he declarant
testifies”
The proposed eSRP exception contains two parts. The determination of which part to apply depends on a single variable: whether the hearsay declarant testifies at trial. If the declarant does not testify, Rule 804(b)(5), the heart of the
proposal, controls and requires a showing that the declarant is
“unavailable” as that term is (already) defined in existing Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a). If the declarant testifies, proposed
Rule 801(d)(1)(D) governs and permits her otherwise qualifying
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115

eSRPs to be admitted as substantive evidence (i.e., for the
116
truth of the matter asserted in the out-of-court statement).
The two components of the proposed exception sweep
broadly. In the spirit of the ALI’s Model Code of Evidence, the
exception excludes otherwise qualifying out-of-court statements
in only one circumstance: when the statement was made by a
declarant who is available to testify at trial, but not called as a
117
witness. In that circumstance, the exception cannot be invoked. The rationale is both familiar and straightforward. The
eSRP exception applies either: (1) when the necessity for admitting hearsay is greatest—i.e., when the declarant is unavailable (804(b)(5)); or (2) when the justifications for the hearsay prohibition are weakest—i.e., when the declarant can be
cross-examined at trial (801(d)(1)(D)). In addition to paralleling
the broad approach of the Model Code, the structure set forth
above mirrors the original SRP exception and Uniform Rule
118
63(4)(c). As the drafters of both provisions recognized, statements of recent perception, while valuable to juries in all other
circumstances, are not preferable to available live testimony
from the hearsay declarant.
B. RECORDED STATEMENTS
“[a] recorded communication”
A key reliability-enhancing trait of electronic out-of-court
statements is that they are invariably recorded. Unlike many
traditional out-of-court statements (e.g., a suspect’s oral confession to a jailhouse informant), text messages, email, and status
updates can be shown directly to the jury. Taking advantage of
115. “eSRPs” is used here as a convenient shorthand for statements that
meet the requirements of the proposed eSRP hearsay exception.
116. See infra Part III.A.
117. See supra Part II.B (discussing Model Code’s approach to hearsay
generally).
118. While Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) required the declarant to be “unavailable,” another Uniform Rule permitted the introduction, over a hearsay objection, of all prior statements of a testifying witness. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1). The
Model Evidence Code also removed prior statements of testifying witnesses
from the hearsay prohibition. See MODEL CODE EVID. 503(b). The original SRP
exception, however, does not apply unless the declarant is unavailable. See
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 377–78 (1969) (providing
proposed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) exception for a “statement of recent perception”).
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this attribute, the proposed eSRP exception requires qualifying
119
statements to be “recorded.” This requirement represents a
novel and important supplement to the original SRP exception,
while simultaneously circling back to the exception’s obscure
roots in a nineteenth-century proposal by James Bradley
Thayer to exempt written statements of deceased witnesses
120
from the hearsay prohibition.
The reliability advantages of recorded out-of-court statements are widely recognized. When an in-court witness relates
another person’s hearsay statement, a danger arises that the
in-court witness’s testimony is unreliable. The testifying witness may mishear, misremember, miscommunicate, or (worst of
121
all) manufacture the out-of-court speaker’s statement. This
concern with the in-court witness’s reliability recedes when the
out-of-court statement was expressed in writing or otherwise
122
recorded. The in-court witness, in fact, becomes superfluous.
As with a recording of a 911 call, jurors can cut out the middleman and “hear” the out-of-court statement for themselves.
119. Cf. Lisa Kern Griffin, The Content of Confrontation, 7 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 69 (2011) (emphasizing that “verbatim recordings” are
generally more useful to jurors than oral renditions of disputed statements);
McCormick, supra note 89, at 588 (noting the “hazard of error or falsity in reporting oral words” and that this hazard “is very much lessened in the case of
previous written statements”).
120. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 303–04 n.1 (The Boston
Book Co. 1908) (reprinting Thayer’s letter to Suffolk County Bar Association
advocating above-described hearsay exception that would become enacted, after modification, in 1898); UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c) cmt. (citing 1898 Massachusetts statute as general precursor to the rule); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65
(2009); infra note 149.
121. Park, supra note 95, at 71 (noting that “the existence of hearsay exceptions that manifest a preference for recorded statements suggests concern
about the danger of misreport and fabrication by the in-court witness”);
McCormick, supra note 89, at 588 (noting that a generally overlooked hearsay
danger is the “hazard of error or falsity in the reporting of oral words”).
122. Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial:
An Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 504–05, 531 (1998)
(emphasizing as a factor in assessing hearsay evidence: “whether the statement was recorded or otherwise verified as actually made by the declarant
such that the factfinder need not rely solely on the credibility of the in-court
witness”); Park, supra note 95, at 57, 71–72 (recognizing that “[t]he danger
that the in-court witness will distort or fabricate a statement is increased by
the difficulty of detection” and suggesting that hearsay exceptions that “apply
only to documentary or other recorded hearsay” are supported, in part, on the
ground that it “is harder to forge a document than to fabricate an oral statement”); cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(5) (2013) (permitting statement explaining
the receipt of an injury if, inter alia, “[t]he statement was made in writing,
was electronically recorded, or made to a physician, nurse, paramedic, or to a
law enforcement official”).
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Anything memorialized by mechanical or electronic means
as the speaker communicates counts as “recorded” for purposes
of the eSRP exception. This includes email typed on a laptop
computer, text messages tapped on a cellphone keypad, Facebook status updates posted at a desktop computer, or tweets
entered on a smartphone. In fact, the bulk of hearsay that is intended to be captured by the exception—text messages, emails,
and social media posts—will easily qualify as “recorded.” These
out-of-court statements are always contemporaneously memorialized by the computer software that enables their exist123
ence.
Importantly, the exception does not encompass statements
that are initially unrecorded, even if they are subsequently
memorialized. Thus, a witness’s oral statement taken down by
a police officer at a crime scene on a tablet computer would not
qualify. While the officer’s transcription of the statement is
“recorded,” the witness’s statement is not, and normal hearsaywithin-hearsay principles apply to exclude the combined state124
ment. Relatedly, the eSRP exception, like the “business records” exception, requires the proponent to introduce the “recorded communication” itself, as opposed to testimony about the
125
communication. Consequently, if a text message, social media
123. Written statements would also qualify as “recorded” and, as detailed
below, are potentially admissible under the exception if an unavailable (or testifying) declarant communicated in writing about a relevant, recently perceived event. See infra note 124.
124. See FED. R. EVID. 805 (requiring each part of a “combined statement”
to conform to an exception to the hearsay rule). Similarly, if a police officer
writes down a witness’s excited utterance, the officer’s written report is not
admissible as an excited utterance because the officer’s written statement describing the utterance constitutes a second layer of hearsay. See id. If, on the
other hand, the officer recorded a witness’s oral statement with a digital recorder, the statement is “recorded,” satisfying that aspect of the eSRP exception. The statement would still not fall within the eSRP exception, however,
due to the exclusion of statements made to investigators. See infra Part III.D.
125. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (providing exception for “[a] record of” a business); United States v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
admission of oral testimony about allegedly lost business records was error,
and noting that “[t]he government has not cited a case in which testimony was
allowed to suffice as secondary evidence of a business record under Rule
803(6)”); State v. Johnson, No. A08–1138, 2009 WL 2150671, *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 21, 2009) (“[A] witness may not testify as to the content of business
records that are not admitted into evidence.”); 5 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES
ON EVIDENCE § 33:18 (7th ed. 1992) (explaining that, under the business records exception, “the record itself must be introduced” and thus “[i]t would not
suffice for a witness to testify that he has examined a company’s record and
then relate from the witness stand what the record said”).
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post, or email could no longer be recovered (and shown to the
jury), testimony about its contents could not be admitted under
126
the eSRP exception.
The excerpted text that leads off this section also includes
a subtle but important deviation from the original SRP exception. The eSRP exception substitutes the word “communication”
for “statement.” The intent of this change is to exclude from the
exception’s scope the small percentage of “statements” that are
not also “communications.” For example, diary entries, memosto-file, draft emails or “notes to self” could constitute “statements,” but not “communications” if the statements, when ut127
tered, were not intended for any audience. Such statements
would not be admissible under the proposed exception.
There are two reasons to limit the exception to “communications.” First, the presence of an intended audience can create
128
an incentive for sincerity. Second, and more important, limiting the eSRP exception’s scope to “communications” decreases
126. See, e.g., State v. Espiritu, 176 P.3d 885, 891 (Haw. 2008) (rejecting
challenge to testimony about deleted text messages allegedly received from
defendant, which were admissible as statements of a party, stating that “if evidence is hearsay admissible under an exception to the rule against hearsay,
then testimony about such evidence is admissible”); Funches v. State, No.
57654, 2012 WL 436635, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 9, 2012) (reviewing challenge to witness’s “testimony that he received a text message from another witness stating
that [the defendant] and two other people had ‘jumped’ the victim”). The “Best
Evidence” rule will sometimes require the same result, although its strictures
are lenient. FED. R. EVID. 1002, 1004 (requiring an original to prove the content of any writing, but providing an exception where, absent bad faith, the
original or a duplicate cannot be obtained).
127. The definition of hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
that a qualifying utterance be “intended . . . as an assertion.” FED. R. EVID.
801(a). Thus, there is an argument that statements not intended to communicate anything to another person are not hearsay at all. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138, 1139 (1935).
128. See HERBERT PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE
WAY OF WORDS 22, 27 (1989) (theorizing as general assumption of participants
in a conversation that neither will “say what you believe to be false”); H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through
the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 792 (1993) (“[P]eople generally tell mostly
the truth to most people most of the time . . . .”); cf. Charles F. Bond & Bella
M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 229, 231 (2006) (describing empirical support for the concept that factfinders can more easily discern the truth of a statement if the
statement is uttered “in the midst of social interaction”); Imwinkelried, supra
note 18, at 321 (“In ‘everyday life’ when we receive a letter, we typically take it
at face value and presume it to be genuine.”). But see Judson F. Falknor, The
“Hear-Say Rule” as a “See-Do” Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 133, 136 (1961) (noting that non-assertive conduct is unlikely to suffer
from hearsay dangers because people rarely lie to themselves).
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the potential for parties to abuse the exception by introducing
self-serving out-of-court statements generated for litigation (or
posterity). Most problematic would be statements that conveniently appear during litigation and purport to narrate disputed
129
events in a way that benefits the offering party. In fact, many
such statements would already fall outside the exception since
130
they are “made in contemplation of litigation.” But courts will
struggle to assess whether something like a diary entry or draft
email was generated with legal proceedings in mind. Explicitly
excluding such non-communicative statements from the scope
of the exception decreases the pressure on judges to smoke out
fabricated statements that appear to satisfy the literal demands of the exception but suspiciously surface during litigation, rather than in real time. Conveniently, the primary targets of the eSRP exception—text messages, email, or social
media postings (and their present and future analogues)—will
virtually always satisfy the “communication” requirement.
C. DESCRIBING RECENTLY PERCEIVED EVENTS
“that describes or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant”
Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and the original SRP exception limit
the subject matter of qualifying statements. A statement that
falls within the exceptions must “narrate[], describe[], or explain[] an event or condition recently perceived by the declar131
ant.” This limitation primarily serves to exclude statements
132
describing events of the more distant past. The eSRP excep129. See 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 8:70, at 599 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing similar problem in context of
statements admitted under Rule 803(3)).
130. See Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(deeming as inadmissible hearsay a police officer’s “factual observations of a
DWI suspect, contemporaneously dictated on his patrol-car videotape”); infra
Part III.D.
131. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (proposed 1979); see also UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4).
The limitation also excludes opinions and speculation, but such statements
(whether in or out-of-court) are generally excluded by other rules. See FED. R.
EVID. 602 (requiring testimony to be based upon “personal knowledge”); FED.
R. EVID. 701 (providing limitations for testimony that is based upon “opinion”).
132. Predictions about future events, general speculation, and opinions (also excluded by this requirement) are already barred by other rules. See FED.
R. EVID. 602 (requiring testimony to be based on “personal knowledge”); FED.
R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (explaining that a hearsay declarant
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tion maintains this limitation which, as explained below, translates nicely into the digital age.
Requiring qualifying statements to be descriptions of “recently perceived” events enhances the reliability of statements
admitted under the proposed exception, while only marginally
restricting its scope. In terms of reliability, recorded descriptions of the distant past engender increased concerns about inaccuracy. Motives for shading or distorting descriptions of past
events are more likely to arise and solidify with the passage of
133
time. In addition, memories steadily degrade as the time between an event and a statement describing that event ex134
pands.
The reliability gains of the eSRP exception’s subject matter
limitation come at little cost. The new wave of electronic utterances described in Part I most commonly involves descriptions
of, or reactions to, recent events. This is a function of the purpose of the new communication tools. Facebook, Twitter, and
texting services are designed to keep others, including often our
family and friends, apprised of recent and ongoing occurrenc135
es. We use these tools—and tolerate their shortcomings—to
must, like a trial witness, be speaking from personal knowledge).
133. See Bellin, supra note 14, at 340 (describing similar rationale for
hearsay exception for present sense impression exception); Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 177, 193 (1948) (suggesting that “the opportunity for reconsideration and
for baneful influence by others” is “more likely to color . . . later testimony
than [a] prior [out-of-court] statement[]”); see also CAL. LAW REVISION
COMM’N, supra note 12, at 313 (Comment to Rule 63(1)) (stating that in “many
cases” a “prior inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the testimony of the witness at trial because it was made nearer in time to the matter
to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced by the controversy which
gave rise to the litigation”).
134. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13 (2009) (“[M]ore
memory is lost in the first hour than in the second hour, more in the first day
than the second day, more in the first week than in the second week, and so
on.”); McCormick, supra note 89, at 577 (discussing scientific findings on
memory degradation at various intervals, which support intuition that “[t]he
fresher the memory, the fuller and more accurate it is”).
135. See generally About, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited
Oct. 13, 2013) (describing Twitter as “a real-time information network” where
users can get “up-to-the-second information” regarding “the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news about what you find interesting”); About, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/facebook/info (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (explaining
that “[m]illions of people use Facebook every day to keep up with friends, upload an unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and learn more
about the people they meet”).
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fill relatively short temporal gaps between our current trans136
mission and our last electronic or in-person communication.
Electronic statements can, of course, describe more remote or
even historic events. However, those that do, like lengthy blog
posts, word processing documents, or emails summarizing past
milestones, resemble familiar analogues such as books, letters,
and diaries. There is little need to tailor the eSRP exception to
such statements. Existing hearsay exceptions crafted with these traditional forms of communications in mind should suffice.
The only real dilemma with respect to the subject matter
limitation arises in its application. A “recently perceived” limitation raises an obvious line-drawing concern: how recent?
Case law applying state variants of Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and
the original SRP exception provides some guidance. Courts applying the “recently perceived” language have, with little controversy, extended the gap between event and statement up to
137
eight days. Longer delays invite more searching scrutiny, but
138
do not necessarily require exclusion. Indeed, in one “unusual
136. Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Mobile Phones, PEW INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT 35–37 (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/
2010/Teens-and-Mobile-Phones.aspx (reporting that when asked why they
text, teens’ most common responses were “to just say hello and chat,” “to report where you are or check where someone else is,” and “to coordinate where
you are physically meeting someone”).
137. See State v. Berry, 575 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan. 1978) (affirming admission
of victim’s statement to detectives eight days after shooting); see also State v.
Peterson, 696 P.2d 387, 395 (Kan. 1985) (affirming admission of statement
under Kansas variant of Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) where statement was “made on
the same day or the following day” after the described event); State v. Brown,
556 P.2d 443, 447 (Kan. 1976) (explaining that the “recently perceived” restriction “allows for a considerable passage of time, so long as the statement
was made at a time when the event could still be reasonably classified as ‘recent’”). But see Ted Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 707 (1962) (suggesting
that a statement made “a full week after” the thing perceived would “not qualify as having been made ‘at a time when the matter had been recently perceived’”); CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 12, at 462 (illustrating the
operation of the temporal limit in the Uniform Rule with a dichotomy of a
statements describing the cause of injury made “the day after [the] injury,” as
opposed to “two months later”).
138. See Brown, 556 P.2d at 447 (explaining that statement “made three
days after” event described “could reasonably” meet recently perceived limitation); Staggs v. State, No. 94,271, 2006 WL 1816339 at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. June
30, 2006) (noting admission of victim’s hearsay statement that was made “several days after” beating described in statement); State v. Kreuser, 280 N.W.2d
270, 273 (Wis. 1979) (rejecting challenge to admission of statement made
“within a day” after event described); cf. State v. Broyles, 36 P.3d 259, 271
(Kan. 2001) (rejecting challenge to exclusion of statements offered under the
exception that were made “some 20 months later” than the described event).

44

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:7

case,” an “eight to ten week” delay was permitted because the
declarant—a victim of an accident—was physically unable to
139
make an earlier statement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
explained:
The mere passage of time, while important . . . is not controlling . . . .
A determination regarding recency of perception depends on the particular circumstances of the case, including whether there were any
intervening circumstances, such as injuries, which precluded or lim140
ited an earlier statement.

As the preceding excerpt makes clear, the “recently perceived” restriction is principally concerned with suspicious delays in reporting an alleged event (as opposed to fading memories), and it should be applied in that spirit. Unnatural gaps
between an event and its description constrict the permissible
time period under the eSRP exception, while more natural gaps
141
due to injuries (or Wi-Fi outages) expand it. This flexibility
will admittedly leave some gray areas for judicial interpretation, but given the nature of electronic communication, the vast
majority of utterances in text messages and social media will
fall comfortably within the exception’s temporal bounds.

D. OUTSIDE THE SHADOW OF LITIGATION
“not including . . . a statement made in contemplation of litigation or to a person who is investigating, litigating, or settling a potential or existing claim”
The eSRP exception—like the original SRP exception and
Uniform Rule 63(4)(c)—attempts to maximize the reliability of
qualifying statements and minimize the dangers of abuse by
excluding from the rule’s scope any statement made in the
142
“shadow of litigation.” The concept is simple and intuitive (if
139. Kluever v. Evangelical Reformed Immanuels Congregation, 422
N.W.2d 874, 875–76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
140. Id. at 877.
141. Cf. Kreuser, 280 N.W.2d at 273 (discounting delay in making of statement where “delay was occasioned by the fact that” the declarant had to track
down the telephone number of the recipient). The original SRP exception contained a distinct safeguard of a “clear” recollection to ensure that the declarant’s memory had not degraded, but how trial courts were supposed to apply
this requirement to absent declarants is unclear, and it is omitted from the
current proposal.
142. See also Thayer, LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 120, at 303 n.1 (reprinting
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not “too obvious to require comment” ): the specter of litigation has a distorting effect, causing some witnesses to deviate
144
from honest narration. Further, litigation creates powerful
incentives for parties to attempt to influence witness state145
ments.
Concerns about the distorting effects of litigation arise
even before formal legal proceedings are initiated, and so the
proposed eSRP exception adopts the original SRP exception’s
broad interpretation of the applicable shadow of litigation. A
statement will not be admissible as an eSRP if it was elicited
during an investigation of a legal claim or otherwise “made in
contemplation of litigation,” even if a suspect had not yet been
arrested or a lawsuit not yet filed when the statement was
made. By contrast, the Uniform Rule permitted statements obtained during a pre-litigation investigation so long as legal ac146
tion had not formally “commenc[ed].”
Thayer’s proposal advocating exception to the Massachusetts hearsay rule
that required statements to be “made in writing ante litem motam,” i.e., before
the litigation).
143. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 12, at 463 (stating that
the necessity for the Uniform Rule’s ante litem motam requirement is “too obvious to require comment”).
144. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 n.9 (2011) (suggesting
that out-of-court statements that are “made for a purpose other than use in a
prosecution” are more likely to be trustworthy); CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N,
supra note 12, at 313 (Comment to Rule 63(1)) (noting that testimony at trial
is often less credible than certain out-of-court statements because, among other things, the statements are “less likely to be influenced by the controversy
which gave rise to the litigation”). In addition to eliminating an incentive to
lie, pre-litigation statements are less likely to be planned, making them easier
for jurors to correctly evaluate. See Bond & DePaulo, supra note 128, at 227
(conducting meta-analysis of studies about the ability to detect false statements and finding evidence that people “achieve higher lie-truth detection accuracy when judging unplanned rather than planned messages”).
145. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9 (“Many . . . exceptions to the hearsay rules . . . rest on the belief that certain statements are, by their nature,
made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and therefore should not
be barred by hearsay prohibitions.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948) (highlighting the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime”); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943) (finding an employee’s
injury report inadmissible because the report was “calculated for use . . . in the
court, not in the business”).
146. Compare State v. White, 673 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Kan. 1983) (statements
to police officers investigating unattended child admissible under Uniform
Rule), and State v. Berry, 575 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan. 1978) (affirming admission
of victim’s statements to detective in hospital room eight days after shooting
under Uniform Rule), with State v. Barela, 643 P.2d 287, 290 (N.M. Ct. App.
1982) (explaining that because victim’s out-of-court statement was “made at
the instigation of the officer[,] the [SRP] exception . . . is inapplicable”). Of
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Given the nature of the electronic communication norm described in Part I, the reliability gains obtained by excluding
statements tainted by the shadow of litigation are, once again,
fairly costless. Text messages and social media posts are rarely
generated by investigators’ queries or otherwise created in con147
templation of litigation. Those that are, such as an email response to a detective’s inquiry about a crime, parallel nonelectronic statements that existing hearsay rules comfortably
148
handle.

E. NO EXPLICIT “GOOD FAITH” REQUIREMENT
“but not . . . an anonymous statement”
Both Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and the original SRP exception
apply only to out-of-court statements “made in good faith.” The
thinking behind this requirement, which can be traced to the
Thayer-influenced 1898 Massachusetts statute referenced ear149
lier, is understandable. In fact, it is hard to argue that any
course, the mere fact that a statement describes something unlawful will not
render it inadmissible because made “in contemplation of litigation.” As with
the analysis of “testimonial” under the Confrontation Clause, this requirement
is intended to exclude statements made with a “primary purpose” of influencing litigation. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
147. For cases considering the contemplation of litigation restriction under
the SRP exception, see State v. Haili, 79 P.3d 1263, 1277 (Haw. 2003) (rejecting the argument that the SRP exception did not apply because the domestic
violence victim may have been contemplating divorce proceedings); and State
v. Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, 1086 (N.M. 1996) (rejecting a challenge to admission of
evidence under the SRP exception where the victim may have been contemplating obtaining a restraining order).
148. The proposed exception does not adopt the original SRP exception’s
proviso that only litigation “in which [the declarant] was interested” triggers
exclusion. Courts will have difficulty determining whether an absent declarant
has an “interest” in potential litigation, and the inquiry has little utility. See,
e.g., State v. Ballos, 602 N.W.2d 117, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding,
somehow, that anonymous callers to 911 “were not involved in or anticipating
litigation in which they were interested”).
149. See supra Part III.B; see also UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c) cmt. (citing 1898
Massachusetts statute as general precursor to the rule); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
233, § 65 (2009) (excepting a statement of a decedent in civil cases “if the court
finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the
declarant”); PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 382–84
(citing the Massachusetts statutes in the advisory committee notes following
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hearsay statement should be admitted unless it was made in
good faith. The difficulty is determining precisely what “good
faith” means in this context and, relatedly, applying the standard in a coherent and predictable manner. As explained below,
these difficulties render an explicit “good faith” requirement
more trouble than it is worth. Consequently, the eSRP exception takes the different and more common approach of relying
on predefined attributes of qualifying statements to determine
reliability (and thus admissibility) in lieu of an amorphous
“good faith” requirement.
The experience of the few states that apply variants of the
SRP exception provides a useful perspective on how a “good
faith” requirement works in application. The Wisconsin
courts—which have grappled with this issue more explicitly
than others—explain that “whether a statement is made in
‘good faith’ depends on ‘the declarant’s incentive to accurately
150
relate the event or condition.’” In Wisconsin, this means that
statements are made in “good faith” if they are communicated
to others with whom the speaker has some connection, for example: a statement made to the declarant’s “girlfriend, who
was the mother of his son and presumably someone he trusted
151
and in whom he confided,” statements made to the declar152
and statements
ant’s “good friend” and his friend’s son;
153
“made to people to whom [the declarant] was close.” Less intuitively, “[b]y their nature, 911 calls are presumably ‘made in

proposed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2)); cf. R.I. R. OF EVID. 804(c) (“A declaration of
a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court
finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action
and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.”); Roger Park, The Hearsay
Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 1057, 1065 n.32 (1986) (tracing lineage of Uniform Rule to Massachusetts
statute). Striking a common chord with the eSRP exception, Thayer’s proposal,
upon which the Massachusetts statute was based, did not include a “good
faith” requirement and applied solely to written statements. See THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 120, at 303 n.1; Chadbourn, supra note 95, at 942–43
(discussing same).
150. State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 820 (Wis. 2005).
151. State v. Manuel, 685 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 697
N.W.2d 811 (Wis. 2005).
152. State v. Weed, 666 N.W.2d 485, 492 (Wis. 2003); cf. State v. Maestas,
584 P.2d 182, 189 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming admission of statements
“made by the victim to [her] sister and sister-in-law”).
153. State v. Kutz, 671 N.W.2d 660, 682 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); cf. State v.
Burke, 574 A.2d 1217, 1223 (R.I. 1990) (affirming admission of statement
made “to a blood relative”).

48

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:7

154

good faith’” for purposes of the exception. In Kansas, we learn
that statements made by young children satisfy the requirement, since “[i]t is highly doubtful [a] six-year-old would
155
make . . . statements except in good faith.”
This state court case law interpreting the “good faith” requirement demonstrates its weaknesses. In essence, courts apply the “good faith” requirement by making an intuition-based
156
judgment about an out-of-court declarant’s sincerity. A witness’s credibility, however, is typically a jury question, and
there is little reason to deviate from that default principle
157
here. Questions about whether an out-of-court speaker would
lie to a loved one, prevaricate in a 911 call, or make a false
statement at a young age can be left to the jury, without any
158
sacrifice of reliability. If the jury determines that the out-of154. State v. Ballos, 602 N.W.2d 117, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
155. State v. White, 673 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Kan. 1983).
156. See Manuel, 685 N.W.2d at 530 (affirming finding of “good faith”
where “[n]othing in the record suggests . . . that [the declarant] lied”); Peter
Nicolas, ‘I’m Dying to Tell You What Happened’: The Admissibility of Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 532–33
(2010) (describing function of “good faith” requirement in the “few states” that
apply it); CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 12, at 463 & n.10 (explaining that “good faith” requirement in Uniform Rule “probably means that the
judge, acting pro hac vice like a juryman, may simply conclude ‘I do not believe
his statement’”).
157. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note, at
405 (“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it has been
described as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary . . . .’”); Chadbourn, supra note
95, at 947 (criticizing Uniform Rule’s provision for exclusion of out-of-court
statement not made in “good faith” as violating the “time-honored formula”
that “credibility is a matter of fact for the jury, not a matter of law for the
court”); cf. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (“[T]he jury,
not the judge, traditionally determines the reliability of evidence.”); Kansas v.
Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009) (“Our legal system . . . is built on the
premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing
witnesses . . . .”).
158. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); FED. R. EVID. 806 (permitting a
party to impeach the credibility of a hearsay declarant “by any evidence that
would be admissible for [that] purpose[] if the declarant had testified as a witness”). That is not to say that juries are particularly adept at this task, just
that judges would be no better. George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector,
107 YALE L.J. 575, 707 (1997) (discussing research that shows that “juries
have no particular talent for spotting lies”); Richard L. Marcus, Completing
Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 759 (1989) (“[C]urrent psychological research provides no basis for believing that assigning the task of evaluat-
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court speaker cannot be trusted, it can discount the statement
accordingly.
In lieu of a “good faith” requirement, the proposed eSRP
exception identifies specific attributes of out-of-court communications, and particularly electronic communications, that en159
hance reliability. This approach places concrete limits on trial
court discretion and creates a measure of predictability and
160
consistency for litigants. Ex ante predictability is particularly
important in modern times, since most cases are resolved in
161
advance of trial.
In assessing the reliability of electronic communications,
one particular characteristic exudes unreliability: anonymity.
As noted in a preceding section, accountability helps to ensure
162
Anonymous statements avoid accountability by
reliability.
163
design. The proposed eSRP exception thus excludes “anonying demeanor to judges would result in significant improvements in deception
detection.”).
159. Cf. Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 909, 920 (1992) (criticizing evidence rules that “utiliz[e] undefined
terms” and “rather than providing a clear rule regulating admissibility,” rely
on judicial discretion thus “invit[ing] the judiciary to assume an undisciplined,
ad hoc approach to applying the Rules”). The Massachusetts statute from
which the “good faith” requirement is drawn required only unavailability
(through death) and “good faith.” See supra note 149, a more sensible approach
than tacking “good faith” onto a handful of specific characteristics.
160. Cf. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 164–65 (1995) (noting that
the drafters of the Federal Rules consciously rejected a “statement-bystatement balancing approach” because “[i]t involves considerable judicial discretion[,] . . . reduces predictability[,] and . . . enhances the difficulties of trial
preparation”); FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note,
at 405 (rejecting proposal for “individual treatment [of hearsay] in the setting
of the particular case” as “involving too great a measure of judicial discretion,
minimizing the predictability of rulings, [and] enhancing the difficulties of
prepar[ing] for trial”); Mueller, supra note 22, at 397 (noting in hearsay context that “[p]ractitioners strongly believe they need protection against broad
judicial discretion”).
161. See supra note 73. These same concerns counsel against any attempt
to broadly filter electronic communications through the residual hearsay exception in Rule 807. See supra note 111.
162. See supra Part III.C; supra note 128.
163. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1559 (2007)
(“Anonymous speech . . . is, on average, less valuable than nonanonymous
speech to speech consumers (audiences) who often use speaker identity as an
indication of a work’s likely truthfulness . . . .”); Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 159, 193–94 (2003) (discussing arguments against anonymous speech in
the First Amendment context, including that a “person who contributes to
public debate anonymously lacks accountability and therefore reliability” and
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mous” statements, which are quite common in the digital
world; comments on blog posts, tweets, or texts will only fall
within the exception if they were made by someone whose iden164
tity is discernible to the communication’s recipients. As already discussed, the proposed exception’s requirement that a
qualifying statement be a “communication” similarly ensures
165
some accountability for insincerity. These complementary requirements dictate that any qualifying eSRP has an identifiable sender and an intended recipient, a low hurdle for the vast
bulk of electronic utterances, and a useful reliability safeguard.
Other mandates of the eSRP exception, including that the qualifying statements arise outside the shadow of litigation and relate to “recently perceived” events, also protect against the admission of unreliable statements. These requirements, working
in concert, separate the bulk of facially unreliable from facially
reliable out-of-court electronic statements. The rest of the work
can be left to juries, the traditional arbiters of the weight to be
166
given to relevant evidence.
To the extent concerns about deception through “bad-faith”
electronic utterances remain, other constraints applicable to all
evidence have a role to play. In particular, authentication re“anonymity creates a greater potential for deception and frivolity”).
164. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 273 P.3d 845, 850 (Nev. 2012) (analyzing
admissibility of text messages sent to assault and robbery victim’s boyfriend
via victim’s cell phone by then-unknown perpetrators of offense). Anonymous
communications will also be difficult to admit due to the independent requirement of personal knowledge, although personal knowledge may be apparent “from [the] statement or be inferable from circumstances.” FED. R.
EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; see also Booth v. State, 508 A.2d 976,
984 (Md. 1986) (noting that extrinsic evidence may demonstrate that a statement results from the declarant’s personal perception); Ira P. Robbins, Writings on the Wall: The Need for an Authorship-Centric Approach to the Authentication of Social-Networking Evidence, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 29–31
(2012) (cautioning against inferring authorship of electronic communications
that are insufficiently authenticated); cf. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44,
§ 116(1)(b) (U.K.) (limiting admission of hearsay statements under certain
provision to circumstances where “the person who made the statement . . . is
identified to the court’s satisfaction”).
165. See supra Part III.C.
166. See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and
Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1992) (concluding from results
of empirical analysis of mock juror study that “jurors are, in fact, skeptical of
hearsay evidence and capable of differentiating between accurate and inaccurate hearsay testimony”); Mueller, supra note 22, at 374 (summarizing argument that juries can be trusted to weigh hearsay); Weinstein, supra note 20, at
353 (“There is little reason to believe that jurors . . . are not . . . capable of assessing hearsay’s force without giving it undue weight.”); see also sources cited
supra note 157.
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quirements dictate that proponents of electronic evidence offer
sufficient evidence to support a finding that statements offered
under the exception are, in fact, actual text messages, tweets,
or Facebook status updates from the person claimed (i.e., that
167
the evidence “is what the proponent claims it is”). Finally,
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 permits courts to exclude cumulative, misleading or unfairly prejudicial evidence of minimal
probative significance.
F. NO EXPLICIT LIMITATION TO “ELECTRONIC” STATEMENTS
The proposed hearsay exception is intended to provide the
factfinder with useful information captured in the ubiquitous
electronic communications chronicled in Part I. It is important
to recognize, however, that the exception does not require that
qualifying statements be “electronic.” The twofold reasoning for
this is explained below.
First, it is hard to precisely define “electronic” in this context, and likely to become increasingly difficult. There are admittedly easy cases. Statements typed on computer keyboards
are electronic, and statements written on paper are not. But
what about a digital recording of an oral statement, or writing
with a stylus on an electronic tablet? The line drawing will become increasingly difficult as technology allows people to interface with computers in myriad ways, blurring the distinction
168
between oral, written, and “electronic” communication.
Second, explicitly distinguishing between electronic and
non-electronic communications would be almost as unhelpful as
it is challenging. As technology evolves, virtually every type of
statement will be utterable with, or without, the assistance of
an electronic device. Assuming all other contextual factors are
167. FED. R. EVID. 901(a); United States v. McGraw, 62 F. App’x. 679, 681
(7th Cir. 2003) (discussing procedure for proving authenticity of evidence and
stating that “the court's role is to examine the evidence to determine whether
the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the
evidence”); State v. Harris, 358 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he
proponent of such evidence [as text messages] must present some proof that
the message[s] were actually authored by the person who allegedly sent
them.”); Rodriguez v. State, 273 P.3d 845, 850 (Nev. 2012) (concluding that ten
text messages were erroneously admitted because not properly authenticated);
Orenstein, supra note 4, at 202 (discussing authentication and new social media); Robbins, supra note 164; see supra note 55.
168. See Claire Cain Miller, Joining the Party, Not Crashing It: Google
Aims for Less Intrusive Ways to Fit into Daily Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012,
at B1 (discussing technological innovations, such as Siri and Kinect, that allow
people to interface with computers through voice and gestures).
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equal, it is difficult to articulate any inherent reliability advantage based on the medium used to express the same recorded message. As the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
recognize, it is not the medium itself, but how the medium is
169
used that informs the reliability of a resulting statement.
Taking the preceding points together, it appears that any
effort to limit the proposed exception to “electronic” communications would be both unruly and unhelpful. Thus, the proposed rule follows the lead of traditional hearsay rules (as well
as Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and the original SRP exception) by not
limiting its application to any particular medium of communication. The bulk of statements likely to be admitted under the
proposed rule will fall within some colloquial definition of “electronic,” but that does not mean that the rule itself must be limited to such statements.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AN “eHEARSAY” EXCEPTION
The preceding sections articulate the justifications for, and
the precise contours of, the proposed “eHearsay” or “eSRP” exception to the American hearsay prohibition. This Part discusses the likely implications of adopting the exception. In particular, it examines the types of statements that, while excluded
under existing evidence doctrine, will be admitted by the new
rule. There are three broad categories of such statements: (1)
eSRPs of testifying witnesses, (2) eSRPs of unavailable victims,
and (3) eSRPs of unavailable third-party witnesses and accom170
plices. Each category is discussed below.
169. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(6) (“[A] reference to any kind of written
material or any other medium includes electronically stored information.”); id.
at 803(6) advisory committee’s note (stating that use of term “data compilation” in business records exception was intended to cover “any means of storing information other than the conventional words and figures in written or
documentary form,” including “electronic computer storage”). By contrast, authentication rules vary more naturally across mediums. See id. at 901 (illustrating various means of authenticating evidence).
170. Another potential category, eSRPs of a non-testifying criminal defendant, is likely precluded by FED. R. EVID. 804(a)’s proviso that the rule’s unavailability requirement is not satisfied “if the statement’s proponent procured
or wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability as a witness in order to
prevent the declarant from . . . testifying.” FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5); see United
States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 413 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that defendant who
invokes Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify could not invoke Rule 804,
because he “made himself unavailable for the purpose of preventing his testimony”); United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 13 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
a person who invokes Fifth Amendment privilege “is considered to be unavailable to others for purposes of Rule 804”); Commonwealth v. Labelle, 856
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Out-of-court statements made by a testifying witness comprise the first category of eSRPs that would routinely be admitted under the exception. A recent bribery trial illustrates how
eSRPs might be used in this context. In United States v. Blackett, a witness’s testimony that she was bribed while serving as
a juror was supplemented with the following text message that
she sent to her sister after the alleged bribe attempt:
You see why I tell you I ain’t want to be no damn juror. Some dude
just come by my house and tell me he going pay me money to say not
171
guilty.

Under existing law, the text—erroneously admitted as a
“recorded recollection”—should not have been admitted over
the defendant’s hearsay objection. (The best the appellate court
172
could say for the ruling was that it was “harmless.”) But under the proposed eSRP exception, the text would be admissible
without doing any violence to other hearsay exceptions (or
harmless error principles), providing the jury with valuable information about the charged crime. An even more compelling
example comes from People v. Lewis, where a prosecutor introduced “enlarged photocopies” of text messages from a sexual
173
assault victim. The prosecutor relied on the messages (which
sought help from friends in dealing with a “guy . . . in my
apartme[n]t” who was “trying to be all o[ve]r me”), and a quesN.E.2d 876, 879 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (following “the view proffered by several
of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that a defendant cannot create[ ] his
own unavailability by invoking his [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege against selfincrimination”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. United States v. Blackett, No. 11-1556, 2012 WL 1925540 (3d Cir.
May 29, 2012); Brief for the Appellee at 8–9, United States v. Blackett, 481 F.
App’x 741 (2012) (No. 11-1556), 2012 WL 1925540, at *3 (providing text of disputed text message).
172. Blackett, 2012 WL 1925540, at *742. The text should not have been
admitted as a recorded recollection since the witness did not have any difficulty remembering the bribery attempt. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 171, at
2; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (requiring statement to concern a matter the
declarant “now cannot recall”); Brief of Appellant Ikim Elijah Blackett at 14–
15, United States v. Blackett, 481 F. App’x 741 (2012) (No. 11-1556), 2011 WL
6935515 (stating defendant’s argument to this effect). The Third Circuit punted the question of admissibility, concluding only that the text’s admission “was
harmless.” Blackett, 2012 WL 1925540, at *742. The defendant was likely
nonplussed as even the prosecution had not claimed that the ruling could be
upheld on that ground. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 171. Additional factual development might have revealed that the text was a present sense impression, but that exception was not cited by either party or the appellate
court. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (describing present sense impression exception
to the hearsay rule).
173. People v. Lewis, No. 1-10-3576, 2012 WL 6861248, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct.
Dec. 28, 2012).
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tionable hearsay ruling, to rebut the defense’s contention that
174
the victim fabricated her testimony about the assault.
Although perhaps not as valuable to juries as eSRPs of absent declarants, eSRPs of testifying witnesses will often constitute compelling evidence. If the eSRP is consistent with the
witness’s testimony, as in Blackett and Lewis, it will flesh out
175
that testimony and make it more credible. The jury will see
what the witness said about the event, exactly as she said it,
during the time period when the event was freshest in her
mind. It is hard to justify a system that would keep text messages like those described above from a jury, and by clearly
permitting such evidence, the proposed exception improves cur176
rent doctrine. In addition, by providing a clear conduit for
admissibility, the eSRP exception reduces the pressure to distort existing rules (as occurred in Blackett and Lewis) to admit
177
this compelling form of proof.
174. See id. at *3–4, *12. The trial court admitted the statements over a
hearsay objection solely to show the victim’s “state of mind.” Id. at *3. But in
response to a defense contention that the lengthy text exchanges admitted at
trial went well beyond that limited purpose, the appellate court deemed the
messages admissible for all purposes as prior consistent statements. The court
ruled that while such prior statements are “[g]enerally . . . inadmissible,” defense counsel’s claim in the opening statement that the victim fabricated her
account to explain the defendant’s presence “in her bed” could be answered by
the text messages, which were uttered (just) prior to the defendant’s appearance in that location. Id. at *11–12.
175. McCormick, supra note 100, at 622 (noting that “[a]n early written
statement may often give needed and legitimate corroboration to the witness’s
testimony, where though his veracity has not been challenged, his testimony is
met by contrary evidence”); see, e.g., Tucker v. Clarke, No. 0037-12-4, 2012 WL
2886713, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. July 17, 2012) (affirming trial court exclusion of
emails sent by mother to third party as hearsay, where email was offered by
mother, who testified in custody proceeding, to corroborate her explanation of
why she acted out in child’s classroom).
176. Cf. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1), cmt., (1953) (asserting that “[w]hen sentiment is laid aside there is little basis for objection” to introduction of a testifying witness’s out-of-court statements as substantive evidence); Edmund M.
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 192 (1948) (expressing similar sentiment).
177. See supra notes 172, 174; see also Abdelrahim v. Guardsmark, No.
B207270, 2009 WL 3823283, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2009) (affirming trial court ruling admitting email as non-hearsay, and ruling that it was admissible solely to show that an email “was sent” or, alternatively, as a business
record and, in any event, its admission was harmless); Funches v. State, No.
57654, 2012 WL 436635, at *1–2 (Nev. Feb. 9, 2012) (concluding that “the district court erred by admitting, under the present-sense-impression hearsay
exception, a witness’s text messages regarding earlier events” because “[t]he
text messages . . . were written . . . shortly after she woke up” and “involved
events that occurred before she went to sleep approximately one to two hours
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An eSRP that is inconsistent with the declarant’s live testimony will be even more valuable to juries and, indeed, is already admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of impeach178
ment. Under current doctrine, when a testifying witness’s
inconsistent hearsay statement is introduced, the court instructs the jury (upon request of a party) that the out-of-court
statement is admissible not for assessing the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., not as “substantive” evidence), but only to
show that the witness said different things at different times
179
and, consequently, may not be credible. The practice of instructing juries on this nuanced distinction between impeach180
ment and substantive evidence is widely ridiculed. Consistent
with a now-pending rules amendment for past consistent
181
statements offered to rehabilitate a witness, the eSRP exception abandons the (likely futile) effort, and allows jurors to conearlier” but suggesting that the messages “were admissible under the excited
utterance exception” (despite the intervening period of sleep!) and, in any
event, were harmless); Robinson v. State, No. 05–10–01022–CR, 2012 WL
130616, at *3 (Tex. App. Jan. 18, 2012) (declining to decide whether email
from testifying witness attaching cell phone picture of suspect, and identifying
the suspect—“im not sure if they are good enough pics but this is tyrone”—
constituted hearsay, but deeming its admission harmless).
178. See FED. R. EVID. 613 (discussing procedures for impeaching witnesses
with prior statements). If the declarant testifies but cannot recall the incident
described in the eSRP, the eSRP could, under existing doctrine, be used to refresh the declarant’s memory, id. at 612, and if necessary, be introduced as a
“recorded recollection,” id. at 803(5); see also 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:19, at 116, § 8:35, at 304 (3d
ed. 2007) (noting that such hearsay statements “are still admissible for impeachment purposes” and citing cases).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 763 (5th
Cir. 2008) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
extrinsic evidence in to impeach witness’s inconsistent statements); cf. FED.
R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (permitting small subset of prior inconsistent statements
to be introduced as substantive evidence).
180. See McCormick, supra note 96, at 562 (characterizing proposal in Uniform Rules to allow “prior consistent or inconsistent statements of a witness as
substantive evidence of the facts” as “well justified” in part because it “avoids
the empty ritual of instructing the jury not to consider the statement as substantive evidence”); Morgan, supra note 176, at 193 (describing instruction to
jury to consider prior statements solely for impeachment as “indulging in a
pious fraud”).
181. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 214 (Preliminary Draft 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/rules/rules-published-comment.pdf (proposing to amend Rule
801(d)(1)(B) to permit prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate witness’s credibility to be used as substantive evidence due to doubt that jurors
can follow limiting instruction).
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sider eSRPs of testifying witnesses as substantive evidence.
While scholars and policymakers have raised thoughtful objections to eliminating hearsay treatment of a testifying witness’s
out-of-court statements, none of those objections apply with any
183
force to the types of statements that are admissible as eSRPs.
The second important category of statements that would
become admissible as eSRPs consists of electronic utterances of
victims who are “unavailable” to testify at trial. In fact, eSRPs
could potentially play a critical role in domestic violence and
sexual abuse prosecutions, where a victim’s status update,
online chat, or text messages to friends about abuse will be
admissible even if the victim refuses to testify, invokes a privilege, cannot be located, or is deceased at trial. A representative
example is a murder victim’s text message (stating that she
and the defendant were “fighting”) offered by the prosecution in
184
State v. Damper to establish the defendant’s motive. People v.
185
Logan provides another example. In that case, a trial court
erroneously admitted text messages sent by a deceased victim
“hours before [her] shooting” which the prosecution used to
demonstrate that the killing by her ex-boyfriend was premedi186
tated. There are unfortunately countless other examples, in182. See supra Part III.A.
183. The objection raised by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee was
the potential for “the general use of prior prepared statements as substantive
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note; cf. CAL. LAW REVISION
COMM’N, supra note 12, at 313 (articulating same objection). Roger Park adds
that Congress feared that permitting substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements would incentivize untoward pretrial interrogation. Park, supra
note 95, at 78–79. Since the eSRP exception excludes statements made to investigators or otherwise “in contemplation of litigation,” both of these concerns
drop away. Judson Falknor’s concern that prior inconsistent statements might
be fabricated if they could be used substantively is mitigated by the precise fix
Falknor proposed: requiring proof that the prior statement was made (here, in
the form of a recording of the statement). Falknor, supra note 66, at 53–54.
184. State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1150, 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting challenge to trial court’s admission of text—“Can you come over? Me
and Marcus are fighting and I have no gas”—as follows: “we cannot conclude
the superior court abused its discretion in ruling the text message constituted
a present-sense impression”); see Bellin, supra note 14, at 344–45 (arguing
that present sense impression exception was never intended to apply to circumstances like Damper where the out-of-court statement is presented without any corroborating witness); cf. Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368, at 12 (2012)
(recounting circuit court ruling admitting defendant’s texts but excluding
murdered victim’s texts in response as hearsay).
185. People v. Logan, No. 303269, 2012 WL 3194222, at *2–3, *6 (Mich. Ct.
App. Aug. 7, 2012).
186. The Court does not specify the content of the text messages, but summarizes that they “indicated that [the] defendant sought to cause ‘conflict’ or ‘a
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cluding many of the tweets, texts, and related communications
187
referenced in the introduction to this Article. In fact, the proposed eSRP exception resonates with a prominent commentator’s proposal that state legislators enact the original SRP exception to counteract recently stiffened Confrontation Clause
restrictions on the admission of hearsay statements by victims
188
of violent crime.
The third important category of admissible eSRPs consists
of communications of uncooperative witnesses. When witnesses
refuse to testify, invoke a privilege, or cannot be brought to trial, their candid statements on social media and in email and
text messages could fill the evidentiary void. One can readily
imagine criminal defendants’ friends and associates, as well as
uninvolved bystanders, unwittingly generating an electronic
189
archive of statements regarding later-litigated events. A reproblem’ for the victim because he was upset about losing her.” Id. at *6. In a
familiar pattern, the appeals court noted that the “text messages were hearsay
to which no exception applied” and thus erroneously admitted, but deemed
their admission harmless error. Id.
187. See, e.g., State v. Petersen, No. 12–1114, 2013 WL 2370717, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 30, 2013) (relying on residual exception to reject hearsay
challenge to admission of victim’s text message to sister recounting husband’s
threats); State v. Ford, 778 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Neb. 2010) (rejecting, on procedural grounds, challenge to trial court ruling admitting the following text
message in rape prosecution: “I just got raped . . By jake . . I dont know what
to do . .”); Martin Fricker & Danny Buckland, Great Ormond St Doc Is Suspended Over Abuse Claim, MIRROR, Apr. 7, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR
6692242 (describing evidence against prominent heart surgeon accused of
child abuse that includes “text messages and voice recordings between two
witnesses”); John Hult, Man Accused of Tying Up, Beating Woman, ARGUS
LEADER, Feb. 23, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 3565811 (reporting statement
of Minnesota prosecutor that “[v]ictims might send text messages or emails
describing violent incidents but change their story and decline to testify after
an arrest is made” in which case “electronic messages are considered hearsay
and are inadmissible in court”); Beth Hundsdorfer, Sheri Coleman Told
Friends About Marital Problems, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Apr. 29,
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 8360616 (describing prosecution’s effort to introduce text messages from deceased victim to friends stating that, among
other things, “her husband beat her”); Michelle R. Smith, Odin Lloyd Texts
Key Evidence in Aaron Hernandez Murder Charge, WASH. TIMES, June 27,
2013,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/27/odin-lloyd-texts
-evidence-aaron-hernandez-murder/?page=all (highlighting text message from
alleged murder victim stating that he was with “NFL” shortly before death);
cf. McCormick, supra note 100, at 624 (noting that Uniform Rule 63(4)(c)
would “open the door to statements by victims of crime”).
188. See Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85
TEX. L. REV. 271, 320–21 & n.274 (2006).
189. See, e.g., State v. Cassano, No. 97228, 2012 WL 2580750, at *5 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 5, 2012) (noting that “[a] major portion of the state’s case con-
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cent Nevada battery trial illustrates a typical scenario. In
Funches v. State, the trial court (erroneously) admitted testimony regarding a text message sent to the defendant’s brother
informing the brother that the defendant and two other people
190
In another example, a student
had “jumped” the victim.
texted his mother after a 2010 school shooting that “there was
a boy who had his hand in his pocket, and when he pulled it out
191
he shot this other boy in the head in the ninth-grade hall.”
These types of text messages, while likely inadmissible under
current hearsay rules, would fit under the eSRP exception,
even if the sender of the message refused to testify, invoked a
privilege, or could not be located at trial. The rule will also aid
criminal defendants with claims of innocence grounded in the
guilt of a third party. If a defendant claims that another person
committed the charged crime, or could provide exculpatory testimony, the third party’s relevant electronic utterances can be
admitted as eSRPs even if the third party raises (as is common
in such circumstances) a Fifth Amendment privilege or is oth192
erwise unavailable to testify.
sisted of the text messages sent from [an alleged accomplice’s] telephone on
the night of the robbery”); Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1002, 1006
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (holding that trial court erred in admitting text messages
sent from the defendant’s phone that indicated the sender’s “intent to deliver
controlled substances” because statements were hearsay and, since defendant
could not be identified as sender, not statements of a party); Sorry, Wrong
Number! Drug-Sale Text Message Goes to Police Instead, CBS CONN. (Jan. 23,
2012,
3:51
PM),
http://connecticut.cbslocal.com/2012/01/23/sorry-wrong
-number-drug-sale-text-message-goes-to-police-instead (describing drug arrest
initiated by text message advertising illicit drugs for sale mistakenly sent to
police officer, and noting that the investigation was ongoing with police seeking the source of the drugs).
190. Funches v. State, No. 57654, 2012 WL 436635, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 9,
2012). In Funches, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that no existing
hearsay exception permitted the testimony about the text message, but in a
familiar pattern, deemed the error “harmless.” Id. In the same opinion, the
Nevada Supreme Court also recognized that the trial court erred in admitting
“a witness’s text messages regarding earlier events” as present sense impressions, but deemed that error harmless as well. Id.
191. Teen Shot at Ala. Middle School Dies; Student Held, DAILY RECORD,
Feb. 6, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 2539972.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 363 (3d Cir. 2012)
(explaining legal doctrine governing strict standard for conferring immunity
on a defense witness against prosecution’s will); United States v. Hardrich,
707 F.2d 992, 993–94 (8th Cir. 1983) (describing scenario where defendant’s
effort to introduce exculpatory testimony was frustrated by witness’s invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege); cf. United States v. Meregildo, 920 F.
Supp. 2d 434, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (evaluating government’s Brady obligations to turn over informant’s Facebook account containing potentially excul-
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Finally, since many of the examples noted above arise in
criminal cases, it is worth emphasizing that the admission of
eSRPs is fully consistent with the Confrontation Clause, a constitutional provision whose mandate to exclude certain
193
unconfronted hearsay trumps the hearsay exceptions. The
Supreme Court recently revised its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence so that the Clause applies only to the admission of
194
Testimonial hearsay, the Court ex“testimonial” hearsay.
plains, consists of statements “procured with a primary purpose
195
of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” By
definition, eSRPs cannot be procured or uttered “in contempla196
tion of litigation.”
Consequently, they will always be
“nontestimonial” and admissible under the Confrontation
Clause even if offered by the prosecution in a criminal case.
The inapplicability of the Confrontation Clause to eSRPs is
particularly salient because resistance to liberalization of the
hearsay rule is sometimes justified on the ground that easing
hearsay restrictions will create a chasm between civil and crim197
inal evidence rules. The chasm forms, in theory, because the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of confrontation in “all criminal
198
prosecutions” counteracts any loosening of the hearsay prohi199
bition in criminal, but not civil, trials. These concerns are absent with respect to the eSRP exception due to the abovedescribed confluence of the requirements of the proposed exception with the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurispru

patory posts, but ultimately rejecting claim, in part because defendant had already obtained access to the account through a private investigator); State v.
Riggins, No. 1CA–CR09–0311, 2010 WL 5545203, at *12 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec.
28, 2010) (ruling that had defendant argued it, trial court’s erroneous exclusion as hearsay of text messages that supported defendant’s self-defense claim
would be found harmless).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him
. . . .”); cf. Bellin, supra note 28, at 40–42 (discussing nontestimonial electronic
statements, stating that they do not trigger the Confrontation Clause).
194. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004).
195. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
196. See supra Part III.D.
197. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory
note, at 405 (pointing to the “split between civil and criminal evidence” that
would arise, due to the application of the Confrontation Clause, as a reason to
maintain the hearsay prohibition); Sklansky, supra note 78.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
199. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note, at 405.
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200

dence. Consequently, the proposal should please both evidence realists and purists; eSRPs will be fully admissible even
in criminal prosecutions, and the evidence rules will continue
to apply with substantial uniformity in civil and criminal litigation.
CONCLUSION
As a result of technological innovations and changing social
norms, an unparalleled wealth of recorded, out-of-court statements resides on computers and mobile electronic devices, waiting to assist the finder of fact. Often uttered to family and
friends outside the shadow of litigation, and preserved in their
original form, these statements could prove invaluable to juries. Unfortunately, this compelling evidence will often be inadmissible due to hearsay rules crafted in an era when electronic communication was unknown.
Since the hearsay rules are tools of our own making, the
most direct response to the recent shift in communication
norms is to craft a new hearsay exception tailored to the unique
attributes of electronic communication. Such an exception
would decrease uncertainty, discourage contortions of existing
hearsay rules, and most importantly, give juries access to a
cornucopia of useful information. The exception should also
strive to screen out the subset of electronic evidence, such as
anonymous statements and statements made in contemplation
of litigation, that is most susceptible to fabrication and abuse.
The daunting task of crafting an “eHearsay” rule is considerably eased by the efforts of a previous generation of evidence
scholars, who proposed the ultimately unsuccessful “Statement
of Recent Perception” hearsay exception with the Federal Rules
of Evidence in 1969. That exception provides a solid base upon
which to build a new exception tailored to the attributes of
modern electronic communication. An eHearsay exception will
allow jurors to see precisely what observers of disputed events
were saying about those events while the events were fresh,
and prior to the distorting (and often silencing) effects of litigation. Jurors, well aware of the electronic communications that
populate their own lives, will increasingly expect access to this
200. See Lininger, supra note 188, at 320–21 & n.274 (“The [SRP] exception
seems particularly well-suited for the Supreme Court’s new confrontation jurisprudence because the rule explicitly bars statements when the declarant
was contemplating litigation or when the declarant was responding to investigators.”).
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electronic “paper trail.” With a proper framework in place,
there is no reason to keep it from them.

